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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis intends to explain the change of strategies to address coca plantation in Colombia 
before and after the 2016 Peace agreement. To do so, I build a theoretical model that draws 
on securitization/de-securitization theory and ripeness/readiness theories. The former theory 
is used to explain what kind of change was there between the different strategies. In this sense, 
I claim that policies to address coca plantation before 2016 Peace agreement, securitized coca 
and framed it as a vital threat, something that ought to be eliminated. On the other hand, the 
Substitution program of the Peace agreement is, I claim, an attempt to de-securitize -move 
back to the realm of politics- the issue of coca plantation. The latter theory is used to explain 
this change and address the characteristics of the ready/ripe moment that made possible the 
peace negotiations and the change of strategies regarding coca plantation. More specifically, 
the analysis centres on the changing of disputants’ aspirations to end the conflict and the 
changing perceptions of each other. I claim that this change of perception of ‘the Other’ is 
fundamental to de-securitize an issue in a conflict. As a result, the attempt to de-securitize 
coca in a context of conflict like the Colombian is done through reconsidering the perception 
of ‘the Other’, the former enemy. 
Keywords: Colombia, Illicit use crops, Securitization and de-securitization processes, 
Readiness and ripeness theory, Negotiated end to the conflict 
Words: 19999 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
The aggressive campaign against coca production in the Andean countries started in the 
1980s. However, it was only until the mid-1990s that this campaign started to focus on illicit 
crops in Colombia. This renewed focus was due to the increasing number of hectares of coca 
that started to be grown in the country. This was the result of the ‘success’ of US led strategies 
like the ‘kingpin strategy’ (Crandall, 2002, p.160) and the ‘shoot-down programs’ (Angrist 
and Kugler, 2008, p.193); that shifted the distribution of coca plantation in the region from 
Peru and Bolivia, to Colombia. This unexpected result of the strategies, ‘…swelled the war 
chests of both leftist guerrillas and right-wing paramilitary groups’ in Colombia (Crandall, 
2002, 160). This change of the drug trafficking dynamic transformed the internal armed 
conflict in Colombia, which at the end of the century had a peak in violence that had not been 
seen since the first half of the century (Chernick, 2005, p.178).  
Consequently, during the 1990s Colombia experienced the expansion of drug trafficking, 
insurgent groups, and paramilitaries while having a weak state power and institutions to face 
them. In this sense, Colombia’s state was considered about to be a failed state, a narco state 
and as such, dealing with a security crisis. In this context, Plan Colombia was signed in 2000 
between the Colombian and the US governments. It was mainly a set of counter-narcotic 
measures that found the ideal justification in 1990s Colombia’s state crisis; to ‘exten[d] the 
war on drugs’ (Crandall, 2002, p.163). 
Plan Colombia put a focus on eradication and militarized strategies to fight cocaine 
production and coca plantation. Accordingly, Colombia’s main strategies to address coca 
plantation have been largely focused on forceful eradication. The 2010-2014 National Policy 
against Drugs defines three main strategies to reduce drug supply, which are focused on 
eradication of coca crops. The first of these strategies is the eradication of illicit crops through 
aerial spraying with the herbicide glyphosate. It started in 1994 and had a steady increasing 
implementation, since 2001, with the execution of Plan Colombia. Consider that until 2000 
an average of 50.000 hectares of coca crops was sprayed (OCD, 20-) and between 2001 and 
2012 this number increased to 126.000 hectares, having the highest peak in 2007, with 
172.026 hectares of coca crops sprayed (UNODC, 2016, p.v).  
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The second strategy is forceful manual eradication and is conducted by mobile groups of 
eradication together with the National Army, the National Police or the National Navy. The 
third eradication strategy is voluntary and is followed by alternative development projects 
that support and promote legal opportunities for former coca growers. However, these 
alternative development projects have been considered, since 1994, a ‘…palliative of the 
social and economic impacts of eradication activities’ as its importance has been subjected 
to its contribution to eradication (Zorro, 2005, p.110). 
This continuous emphasis on forceful eradication strategies goes in line with the already 
mentioned 1990 militarization of the drug war in the region. In this sense, the national 
policies against drugs have remained largely unchanged. Recent changes regarding 
eradication policies have pointed out in the direction of consolidating and coordinating the 
different strategies, but the main focus remains to be eradication. This emphasis has persisted, 
despite numerous attempts to open up the debate about the need to change the approach of 
the ‘war on drugs’.  
In fact, regional attempts to produce a fragmentation of the paradigm of the ‘war on drugs’ 
include, for instance, Bolivia’s recognition of coca leaf as a ‘…cultural patrimony, a natural 
and renewable resource of Bolivia’s biodiversity and a factor of social cohesion; which in its 
natural state is not considered a narcotic’ (My translation, Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
2009) and Uruguay’s legalization of marijuana in 2016, being ‘…the first country in the 
world to pass a law legalizing the recreational use, sale and cultivation of marijuana’ (The 
Guardian, 2016). In the same direction, Colombia’s President Juan Manuel Santos ‘…has led 
the critiques against the traditional policies and […] has even suggested the need to open the 
legalization debate’ (My translation, Soberón, 2013, p.37).  
These efforts of Colombia’s government to open up the debate at an international level 
contrasts with the largely unchanged focus of the national policies to address coca plantation. 
In fact, Eventon claims that ‘…the Santos administration has played a double game, using 
repressive and draconian methods at home while in the international arena preaching the need 
for reform and human-rights based approaches’ (2016, p.3).  
Colombia’s apparent inability to open up the debate on drugs at an international level or make 
substantial changes to this militarized eradication-centered approach seems to change in 2016, 
with the Peace agreement1 signed in Colombia. This Peace agreement is the result of about 
six2 years of negotiations between president Santos and the top leader of Colombia’s biggest 
guerrilla, Rodrigo Londoño, alias ‘Timochenko’. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia- People’s Army- FARC were3 the oldest communist guerrilla of the continent. It 
was founded in 1964-66, when violent, exclusive and limited political scenario was the rule 
                                                            
1 Final agreement for the termination of the conflict and the construction of a stable and longstanding peace 
2 Including the exploratory talks that started in October 2011 (WOLA, 201-) 
3 I refer to them in past, anytime the signature of the Peace agreement entailed the end of FARC as a guerrilla 
and their transit to a political party.  
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in Colombia (Uribe Calderón, 2007, p. 84) and when a revolution appeared as ‘a viable model 
for changing society’ (Farah, 1994).  
The 2016 Peace agreement put an end to Colombia’s internal armed conflict, which had been 
active since 1964 and resulted in over 222.000 deaths, most of them (85%) civilians (GMH, 
2016, p.32) and the forceful displacement of 15% of Colombia’s population (5.700.000 
people) (GMH, 2016, p.34). One of the six issues agreed on this document was the Solution 
to the problem of illicit drugs, which includes a Program of Substitution of illicit use crops.  
Given the prevalence of the militarized approach in Colombia’s strategies to fight coca 
plantation, despite regional sprouts of demands for a change of paradigm and the discursive 
attempts of Santos that have had no real changes at an international or national level so far; 
the research question this thesis aims to answer is: Why is there a change regarding actions 
against coca plantation, between the ‘2010-2014 National Policy against Drugs’4 and the 
public policy envisioned in Colombia’s Peace agreement approved in 20165?  
To answer this question, I will use a theoretical model that draws on securitization/de-
securitization theory and ripeness/readiness theory. The former theory is used to explain what 
kind of change was there between the different strategies. The latter is used to explain this 
change and address the characteristics of the ripe/ready moment that made possible the peace 
negotiations and the change of strategies. 
In this sense, Chapter 2 develops in detail securitization/de-securitization theory (in 
subsection 2.1), ripeness/readiness theoretical framework (in subsection 2.2) and the 
proposed theoretical model that merges both theories to explain the attempt to de-securitize 
coca plantation in a context of conflict (in subsection 2.3). Chapter 3 is structured to follow 
the order presented in the theoretical model. Accordingly, subsection 3.1 identifies the 
components of securitization in the strategies used to fight coca plantation before the Peace 
agreement. Subsection 3.2 explore the concepts of crisis of tactics and crisis of strategy in 
the process to the 1999 and 2012 peace dialogues and the perceptions of the conflict of 
Colombian government and FARC. Subsection 3.3 focus on the analysis of the two 
mechanisms that Motivation has to influence Optimism that are most relevant to the 
investigation: the scaling down of aspirations (developed in subsection 3.3.1) and the change 
of perception of the enemy (developed in subsection 3.3.2). Lastly, subsection 3.4 identifies 
the components of de-securitization of the strategies used to fight coca plantation in the 
program proposed in the Peace agreement and mentions the difficulties such an attempt can 
have.  
                                                            
4  The 2010-2014 National Policy against Drugs was the latest and broadest official tool to address drug 
trafficking before the Peace agreement. However, it is not the only official document that is going to be 
considered. In this sense, the analysis of this policy includes other plans, programs, official documents and 
campaigns to implement the strategies against coca plantation. 
5 I refer here to the last document of the Peace agreement, which was approved by Colombia’s Congress on 
November 2016, after the earlier version (that of the 24 August 2016) was rejected in a referendum conducted 
in October 2 2016 (Casey, 2016). 
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Finally, this thesis is framed in the literature about securitization/de-securitization and 
conflict resolution. In relation to the literature of securitization associated with the 
Copenhagen School, this thesis expects to contribute to the group of attempts to apply 
securitization to empirical cases and the very small group that try to do so in non-European 
cases (Çoskun, 2011, p. 7).  
More importantly, this investigation seeks to create a dialogue between securitization theory 
and theories about conflict resolution. Some studies (Çoskun, 2011; Oelsner, 2005) use both 
securitization/de-securitization and peacebuilding theories to analyze conflicting relations 
between states. Differently, this analysis focus on the previous process of peacebuilding: the 
start of peace negotiations; the formal result: the Peace agreement and two disputants within 
a state. The emphasis on both securitization and de-securitization allows an analysis that can 
theoretically build more on the underdeveloped concept of de-securitization.  
In this context, this thesis seeks to extend the explanatory power of the theories used to a case 
that has been not analyzed with this scope before. Analysis about the securitization of drugs 
at an international, regional (Latin America) and national (Colombia) level have been done 
(Crick, 2012; Oelsner, 2005; Hesselroth, 2005). However, none of these analyses have looked 
specifically at the securitization of coca plantation and its possible de-securitization in a 
context of conflict resolution.  
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2. Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter describes two complementing explanations for the change in the strategies 
against coca plantation in Colombia in the Peace agreement: securitization and ripeness 
theory. The former addresses how an issue is construed as a matter of security while the latter 
reflects on the conditions that make possible the negotiation of a peace agreement between 
the conflicting parties, by bringing in new issues to the table. 
 
 
2.1 Securitization theory. 
Securitization theory was first developed in the late 1980s by the Copenhagen School6 
(Çoskun, 2011, p.7).7 The main claim of the Copenhagen School is that the word ‘security’ 
and the language used to present an issue in security terms (‘threat’, ‘war’, ‘defense’, etc.) is 
not merely descriptive. Rather than describing an objective threat, this language is used to 
frame an issue as threatening (Wæver, 1997 quoted by Çoskun, 2011, p.8). Thus, security 
issues do not rely necessarily on external objective threats; language does something, in this 
case, it is used by leaders to shape the world in a certain way and build a ‘threatening other’. 
This capacity of the language to do and not just describe is one of the main assumptions of 
the Copenhagen School. In this framework, a speech act is an utterance that performs an 
action. 
Therefore, securitization theory analyses the process through which an issue is framed in 
security terms, which is called securitization. According to Balzacq (2011, p.3), 
securitization is: 
…an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image 
repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilised by a securitizing actor, 
who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, 
thoughts, and intuitions) about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the 
securitizing actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura 
                                                            
6 Usually, securitization theory has been described as developed by different schools like Copenhagen School, 
Paris School and Aberyswyth School. 
7  However, as Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka (2016, p.496) claim, the studies of ‘how social issues are 
designed’, which are closely linked to the security theory approach; were conducted since the 1970s by different 
scholars. 
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of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customised policy must be immediately undertaken to 
block it 
In other words, a securitization process is brought into being by a Securitizing actor. The 
Securitizing actor claims that the entity at risk (Referent Object) is threatened. This threat 
comes from what is represented as a ‘vital threat’, which is the Referent Subject. All this 
discursive construction is presented to audiences through different types of speech acts, in a 
specific context. The context’s main role is to facilitate or hinder the securitization process. 
According to Fierke, this securitization process is about the consolidation of ‘the Self’, the 
Referent Object, in contrast to the definition of ‘the Other’, the enemy (Referent Subject) as 
an existential threat (2007, p.112). This framing of an existential threat made by the 
Securitizing actor, which is called ‘securitizing move’ (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998, 
p.25) might make reference to the audiences’ experience so that they feel identified (Balzacq, 
2011, p.9) and ‘…some sort of cognitive and behavioral change occurs’ (Çoskun, 2011, p.15) 
in relation to how ‘the Other’ is perceived.  
The success of the ‘securitizing move’ relies on its acceptance by the Enabling audience. The 
Enabling audience is the audience that ‘…has the ability to empower the securitizing actor 
[or the appropriate authority] to adopt measures in order to tackle the threat.’ (Balzacq, 2011, 
p.34). The Securitizing actor can address a variety of audiences, who might provide the 
Securitizing actor with different forms of support. Balzacq (2011, p.9) identifies two ways in 
which the audience can support the Securitizing actor: moral and formal support. The moral 
support, usually found in civil society, is generally necessary, as it legitimizes the move, but 
not enough for the securitizing move to be successful. The formal support is usually a 
decision of an institution that allows the Securitizing actor to take the measures required, and 
as such is necessary and sufficient. The formal support is the support of the Enabling 
audience, as it is the one that makes the ‘securitizing move’ successful. The Enabling 
audience is the audience that can give formal support and empower the Securitizing actor to 
adopt exceptional measures, distinctive policies or the actions that the Securitizing actor 
deems necessary, whatever they are.  
Regarding the Securitizing actor is important to mention at least two issues. First, the 
Securitizing actor has the capabilities and social power to speak on behalf of others’ security 
and be heard, as it makes part of the elites. Anyone can discursively create a threat, but not 
all the actors are in the same power position: ‘[s]ecurity is articulated only from a specific 
place, in an institutional voice, by elites’ (Wæver, O., 1995, p.57). Second, the successful 
securitization of an issue gives special grants for the elites to get above normal politics. This, 
in turn, increases their power, which is why Çoskun (2011, p.15), Huysmans (2006, pp.6-9) 
and Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka (2016, pp.517-518, 521) claim that securitization is a 
technique of governance. Finally, as the Enabling audience might be the inner circle of the 
Securitizing actor, securitization might reinforce the power of the elites.  
As the ‘securitizing move’ frames the issue as a threat to the survival of the Referent Object, 
it must have absolute priority and cannot be dealt with normal politics. This means that the 
result of a successful ‘securitizing move’ is the possibility of the Securitizing actor to go 
12 
 
beyond the regular rules that it was formerly bound to, as it puts ‘…the issue either as a 
special kind of politics or as above politics’ (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998, p.23). This 
is why the construction of the existential threat ‘…can thus be used to legitimate political 
action which might not otherwise appear as legitimate’ (Çoskun, 2011, p.9), like less 
democratic and more authoritarian strategies.   
To sum up, the securitization of an issue is a process in which the Securitizing actor describes 
‘the Other’ as a vital threat (Referent Subject) to ‘the Self’ (Referent Object), through a 
speech act. This speech act is presented by the Securitizing actor to the audiences seeking for 
support. Once the Enabling audience does accept and support this ‘securitizing move’, it 
empowers the Securitizing actor to adopt exceptional measures or distinctive policies to 
address the ‘vital threat’. These are the result of a successful securitizing move. The speech 
act is built making reference to the features of the context, the external reality, to make the 
securitizing move more compelling to the audiences. Figure 1 visually presents the relation 
between these concepts, where SA is the Securitizing actor, RO is the Referent Object, RS is 
the Referent Subject and EA is the Enabling audience. 
Figure 1. Securitization theory 
 
Thus the Copenhagen School is critical to both the traditional security studies and the 
‘widener’ approach. Traditional security studies assume that threats are previous to language 
and claim that more security is always better. The latter argues that security should include 
more issues (Wæver, 1995, p.46). In contrast, the Copenhagen School is critical about the 
definition of security itself and focuses on the process of framing an issue as a matter of 
security through speech acts. This is not to say that the Copenhagen School claims that there 
is no objective reality, instead, it means that the ‘security-ness’ of issues is not dependent on 
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objective realities, but on the intersubjective process of securitization8. The features of reality 
are part of the securitization process’ context (which are considered facilitator conditions); 
and not external, independent and objective threats. Besides this, the Copenhagen School 
claims that a securitization of larger aspects of life is not desirable, thus more security is not 
better. This is going to be further developed when talking about de-securitization.   
According to Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998, pp.32-33) the facilitating conditions can 
be divided in two, internal and external. The internal conditions refer to the usage of the 
grammar of security in the speech act. This grammar of security in the speech act of the 
‘securitization move’ entails the construction of a plot that includes an existential threat (RO, 
RS), a point of no return and a possible way out. The external conditions refer to social and 
contextual conditions. The first one refers to the ‘social capital’ of the Securitizing actor, its 
position of authority regarding the audience(s) and hence ‘…the likelihood of the audience 
accepting the claims made in a securitizing attempt’ (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998, 
p.33). The contextual conditions denote ‘…the features of the alleged threats that either 
facilitate or impede the securitization’ (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998, p.33). The 
central components and the facilitating conditions of securitization can be seen in Table 1. 
 
2.1.1. Potential advantages and disadvantages of Securitization and the option 
of De-securitization 
 
A recurring critique to securitization is its lack of a normative approach of weather 
securitization should be performed or not. According to Balzacq, the ‘…model of 
securitization specifically does not address the counter-factual question of whether particular 
securitizations were necessary; i.e. that some moves should be or should have been rejected.’ 
(2011, p.122). However, literature has been written about the potentials advantages and 
disadvantages of securitization, which will be discussed in this section. This discussion will 
be followed by a description of de-securitization as the concept that refers to the process in 
which a securitized issue is taken back to the realm of normal politics.  
According to the literature, the main advantage of the securitization of an issue is its 
prioritization, which might come with an increased funding and attention. Buzan, Wæver, 
and de Wilde, claim that this is why securitization also has ‘tactical attractions’, as it might 
be used to get preeminence on issues that otherwise are kept out of the agenda, like 
environmental problems (1998, p.29).  
One of the disadvantages of securitization is the emphasis it puts on forceful strategies. 
Wæver points out that despite securitization has the ability to dramatize an issue, resulting in 
                                                            
8 The securitization process is inherently intersubjective due to the relation between the Securitizing actor and 
the audience. However, there’s a tension between securitization’s intersubjectivity and subjectivity. See more 
about this tension in Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka (2016). 
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a mobilization of resources and the prioritization of the issue; ‘[w]hen a problem is 
‘securitized’ there is the risk of addressing it in particular ways: threat, defense, and state-
centered solutions.’ (1995, p.65). So it tends to ‘…produce thinking in terms of us-them’ 
(Wæver, 1995, p.64), which places threats coming from outside the Referent Object. This in 
turn moves the attention away from the Referent Object’s own contributions to the problem.  
In relation to this Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka mention that scholars of securitization have 
highlighted the tendency of the field of security/insecurity9 ‘…to conquer other fields and 
subsume them under their logic’ (2016, p. 505). This means that issues like migration, asylum, 
terrorism and drug trafficking which have been securitized are ‘…handled through the 
exclusive lens of security, at the expense of other possibilities, such as social inequality or 
global injustice’ (Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka, 2016, p. 505). Therefore, when an issue is 
securitized, and the security strategies aforementioned are implemented to non-military 
problems, it neglects other strategies and thus other causes of the problem. 
Another disadvantage of securitization is the reinforcement of already existing power 
structures. As mentioned before, for the ‘securitization move’ to be successful it has to be 
uttered from a place of power, by elites. As the Securitizing actor makes part of the elites and 
has enlarged privileges due to the acceptance of its ‘securitizing move’; its power has 
increased, usually on behalf of the marginalization of others. In a democratic society, a 
successful securitization ‘…may occur at the expense of liberal democratic principles and 
may lead to an erosion of civil liberties’ (Çoskun, 2011, p. 10). At the end, securitization is 
always ‘for someone and for something – it grants powers, privileges and positions to some 
and excludes others’ (Balzacq, 2011, p.122).  
Having this in mind is important to turn now to the concept of de-securitization which has 
remained largely untheorized by the Copenhagen School scholars (Çoskun, 2011, p. 18). This 
concept was first used by Wæver in 1995 in the chapter ‘Securitization and De-securitization’ 
of the book On security. Despite what was said at the beginning of this section, the 
Copenhagen School claims that a securitization of larger aspects of life is not desirable, thus 
more security is not better. Likewise, Wæver (1995, p.57) does have a normative approach 
regarding the ‘effectiveness’ and ‘desirability’ of securitization. According to him, 
securitization ‘…should be seen as negative, as a failure to deal with the issues as normal 
politics.’ (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998, p.29).  
In this sense, de-securitization entails moving the issue that was securitized from being 
considered a ‘threat’ to be considered a challenge, from it being dealt through special 
measures, to the ordinary bargaining of the political sphere ‘…so that violence will no longer 
be considered as a legitimate option’ (Çoskun, 2011, p. 18). De-securitization is then when 
                                                            
9 It is important to note that the field of insecurity is the same of that of security, as this two concepts are 
construed based on each other. As Çoskun puts it ‘…security is always relational in the sense that one’s 
insecurity/security centres [sic] on other(s’) insecurity/security – the classical formulation of a security dilemma’ 
(2011, p.12). 
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the issue is not defined in terms of security or insecurity. This can be then described as 
‘asecurity’ or ‘non- insecurity’ (Wæver 1998:81 quoted by Çoskun, 2011, p. 19).  
As the concept has remained untheorized by the Copenhagen School scholars, authors like 
Oelsner (2005) and Çoskun (2011) have tried to develop the concept further so that they can 
use it in the case analysis they intend. Oelsner (2005) uses it to analyze the relation between 
some states in Latin America while Çoskun (2011) does it to analyze the case of Israeli-
Palestinian relations. Çoskun (2011, p.21) infers the components for the desecuritization 
analysis, using the same components of securitization with some adjustments so that they 
refer to the opposite direction of the securitization process. Table 1 shows the components 
and facilitating conditions for both securitization and de-securitization, according to the 
attempt made by Çoskun (2011) to theorize about de-securitization. 
Table 1. Components of Securitization and De-securitization analysis 
 
Source: Çoskun, 2011, pp.13, 21. 
In relation to this is important to mention that the lack of security speech that implies a 
redefinition or reinterpretation of the issues that were securitized, cannot consist on a speech 
affirming such a change. In other words, the politization of a former securitized issue can 
only happen away from security terms (Wæver, 1995, p.56) and not by explicitly saying so. 
Now, according to Oelsner (2005, p.4) there are two ways in which a former securitized issue 
is de-securitized: the passive way and the active way. The former refers to an issue that 
‘…loses its threatening image’ (Oelsner, 2005, p.22) while the latter is about an issue being 
reassessed in its relation with the Referent Object. Regarding the ways in which an issue can 
be de-securitized, Huysmans (2006, pp.143-144) claims that the political sociology of 
everydayness, could ‘…de-dramatize security questions’ as it broadens the context and puts 
in the image the complex mediations of daily life of ‘the Other’, the Referent Subject. This 
gives place to other policies to address the issue at stake.  
Finally, it is important to point out that the De-securitizing actor can also be the one which 
previously encouraged a process of securitization (Çoskun, 2011, p. 20). However, this is not 
 Securitization De-securitization 
Components 1. Securitizing speech act  
2. Securitizing Actor (SA) 
3. Audience(s) 
[Results, if succesful] 
1. De-securitizing Language  
2. De-securitizing actor 
3. Audience(s) 
Facilitating 
conditions 
4. Grammar of security (RO, RS 
and way out) 
5. Social conditions: position of 
authority of the SA regarding the 
audience(s) 
6. [Context] ‘features of the alleged 
threats that either facilitate or 
impede the securitization’ 
(Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 
1998, p.33) 
4. The change in the language 
used to define the previously 
securitized issue 
5. Social conditions: position of 
authority of the DA regarding 
the audience(s) 
6. [Context] conditions that point 
out the necessity for de-
securitization 
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to say that this de-securitization process will necessarily be accomplished due to it being 
promoted by which was once the Securitizing actor. This process would probably depend on 
the context and the discourses that the ‘securitizing move’ has produced already, which are 
related but independent of the ‘securitizing move’. In relation to this, Aradau claims that the 
Desecuritizing actor ‘…should not be the self-same agents of securitisation [instead they] 
should be from within the previously silenced ‘other’.’ (Çoskun, 2011, p. 20) 
One of the contributions of the practice-approach of securitization is that it shows why 
practices regarding the securitization of an issue are important in its construction as well as 
in its continuity as a securitized concern. In relation to this, Bigo’s argument is that 
‘…securitization circulates and produces effects through the daily routines of the insecurity 
professionals’ (Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka, 2016, p. 506). This means that the practices, 
the bureaucracy and the expertise generated by the securitizing speech act reproduces, in a 
daily basis, this security approach. These daily routines make it more difficult to break free 
from the securitization approach, which is why it remains so difficult to de-securitize a 
subject once its securitization has been institutionalized. 
 
2.1.2. Securitization of drugs at an international level and the place of the US 
in this process. 
 
Crick (2011) shows how at an international level the issue of drugs has been securitized and 
portrayed as an existential threat. She does so analyzing the prologue of the 1961 UN Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Trafficking of 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and Russia’s 2010 ‘Rainbow-2’ Plan to 
eradicate opium production in Afghanistan. The importance of analyzing Russia’s speech act, 
is that it allows her to show how an international framework legitimizes other countries to 
pursue similar securitizing approach to drugs (Crick, 2011, p.412). She identifies in these 
speech acts the main components of the securitization theory: Referent Object, Securitizing 
actor, Referent Subject, audiences and results. I’m going to focus on the first two speech acts, 
as those are the ones that show how drugs are securitized at an international level. 
In the case of the 1961 UN Convention, the entity that’s at risk, the ‘Self’ (Referent Object) 
is portrayed as ‘mankind’ in opposition to the vital threat, the ‘Other’ (Referent Subject) that 
is presented as the ‘serious evil’ of drug addiction. In the 1988 UN Convention, the ‘Self’ is 
the society and the state, while the threat is the ‘production and trafficking of drugs and the 
links with organized crime and terrorism’ (Crick, 2011, p.410). Crick notes, based on 
Herschinger’s (2011, p. 96) claims, that the metaphor of evil in the 1961 UN Convention 
gave ground to the war-metaphor that switched its focus from ‘mankind’ to the state (2011, 
p. 411). The war metaphor can be clearly identified in Nixon’s speech in 1971 where he 
placed ‘drug abuse’ as ‘America's public enemy number one’ and in Ronald Reagan’s, who 
in 1982 stated ‘…we're going to win the war on drugs’ (Shimko, 1991, p.79). According to 
Wisotsky (1986, p.5 quoted by Shimko, 1991, p.81), Reagan ‘…succeeded in literally 
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militarizing what had previously been a rhetorical war by deploying the military forces of the 
United States in drug enforcement operations’. 
US attitude towards drugs greatly defined the attitude at an international level in this regard. 
Actually, Crick (2011) points out that although the UN is the Securitizing actor in both UN 
Conventions, the US had an important leading role and influence in both, especially in the 
1988 UN Convention (Crick, 2011). This influence is acknowledged by Stewart (1990, p. 
388) who claims that the similarities between legal approaches already done in the US and 
the 1988 UN Convention itself were in line with this country’s active participation in the 
negotiation. 
This gives us ground to argue that the prohibition of drugs through the international system 
reveals the US massive influence at international institutions, and thus the existence of a 
power structure among states. In fact, Pryce (2006, p. 605) points out that the ‘…menu of 
prohibited substances largely reflects the assumptions, prejudices, customs and above all 
economic interests of the United States and Western Europe who dominated the League of 
Nations in the 1920s and 30s and the United Nations post 1945’. 
In this sense, the definition of what is a prohibited drug, in contrast to those that are legal, is 
not only related to the harm that those drugs cause. Instead the prohibition of certain drugs 
can be ‘…partly explained by ‘otherness’ and ‘xenophobia’’ (Pryce, 2006, p.604), as it was 
those drugs that were new in a community and whose effects were unknown, the drugs that 
were feared, prohibited and racialized (Murji, 1998). 
In relation to this is relevant to quote the answer of John Ehrlichman, the Watergate co-
conspirator during Nixon’s administration, in an interview conducted in 1994:  
The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar left 
and black people. You understand what I’m saying? We knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either 
against the war or black, but by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks 
with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could arrest 
their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them night after night on the evening 
news. Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of course we did. (Baum, 2016) 
So drugs securitization does not only put on evidence international power structures between 
states, but also those within states. Hesselroth (2015, p.61) precisely shows that when she 
claims that Bolivia’s antinarcotics policies from mid-twentieth until 2006, are result of 
external and internal colonialism. The former refers to US pressure and the latter to the elite 
in the country; both of which made possible the implementation of antinarcotic policies that 
went against the country’s population (Hesselroth, 2015, pp.69-74). 
Finally, in Crick’s analysis (2011), the audiences of the UN Conventions she analyses are the 
UN country representatives and member states’ national governments. The results, that Crick 
calls ‘extraordinary measures’; is the ‘global prohibition of certain drugs through the 
international regime’ with 1961 UN Convention and the ‘[i]ncreased militarization of law 
enforcement and eradication strategies’ with the 1988 UN Convention (Crick, 2011, p.410). 
These results show, according to the securitizing theory, that the enabling audiences accepted 
and agreed on the ‘securitizing move’ and thus legitimized the ‘extraordinary measures’.  
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These extraordinary measures can be practically identified in US foreign drug policies in 
Andean countries, which can be classified in policies with mechanisms of control and 
policies with mechanisms of aid (Hesselroth, 2005, p.3; Hesselroth, 2015, p.66). The former 
include ‘…forced eradication of coca crops, military assistance and the process of 
certification’ (Hesselroth, 2015, p.66) and the latter entail ‘…economic assistance to promote 
a variety of counternarcotics efforts’ (Hesselroth, 2015, p.67), like Alternative Development 
Programs and trade agreements to exempt from tax certain goods from Andean Countries 
(Andean Trade Preference and Drug Eradication). 
It is important to note that the process of certification, from the mechanisms of control, 
constitutes an annual evaluation of the counternarcotic efforts of drug-producing and drug-
transit countries. In case the country is not certified, it could face not having US aid to non-
drug-related programs, not having access to trade deals and ‘…US opposition to requests 
before multilateral development banks’ (Hesselroth, 2015, p.66). These global mechanism, 
which started in 1986, was further legitimized by the 1988 UN Convention (Crick, 2011). In 
case this is not enough to show the importance of US foreign policies in imposing and 
implementing a securitized approach to tackle drug trafficking in drug-producing and drug-
transit countries in the region, then it is worth mentioning that there was an increased 
militarization since 1980s, with US military members training and equipping anti-narcotic 
forces in ‘host countries’, increasing funding to focus drug control from a military 
perspective and support of militarized crop eradication policies (Hesselroth, 2005, p.6; 
Bagley, 1988, p.189). 
As the theoretical description of securitization already suggested, this process of framing an 
issue as a security threat can be identified in the use of language as well as in the practices 
and processes implemented. The consequences of framing an issue as a war are an all-out 
expenditure to ‘combat’ the enemy, ‘…restrictions on behavior and rights that are typically 
protected but come to be viewed as unaffordable luxuries during wartime’ (Shimko, 1991, 
p.79) and the focus on forceful and military solutions. Indeed, the provision of US military 
aid increased “…the militarisation of rural areas and human rights violations, creating a 
serious risk for fragile Andean democracies that has a negative affect on their anti-narcotics 
efforts.” (Hesselroth, 2005, p.8). Certainly, “…the rhetorical ‘War on Drugs’ at times 
becomes a very real war as in […] Colombia, Mexico or Afghanistan.” (Crick, 2011, p.413). 
 
 
2.2. Ripeness and Readiness theory.  
 
I am going to use the ripeness and readiness theory as a tool to show how a ripe moment in 
a violent conflict can make possible taking decisions towards a change of paradigm, in this 
case drug policy, even when not being entitled to do so, at an international level. With this 
objective in mind, this section will start with a description of the main elements of ripeness 
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theory, which was first conceptualized in 1985 by Zartman; to then describe what Priutt 
(2005) built as a ‘clarifying derivative’ of the ripeness theory, called readiness theory. 
Ripeness theory intends to explain why and when conflicting parties could turn to a 
negotiated resolution of the conflict (Zartman, 2007, p.232). The main two elements of a ripe 
moment, the moment when the conflicting parties search a negotiated resolution of the 
conflict, are the perception of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate and the perception of a Way Out. 
On the one hand, the Mutually Hurting Stalemate is the moment when the present and its 
current course in the future (continuing conflict) seem less preferred than a negotiated 
solution. In this sense, continuing conflict seems like a deadlock, as the escalation will not 
take any of the parties to the victory and it ‘…is painful for both of them...’ (Zartman, 2007, 
p.232). On the other hand, the Way Out, the second element of the ripe moment, entails the 
possibility of the actors to perceive that a negotiated solution to the conflict is available. To 
sum up, the conflict is ripe for negotiations towards a resolution ‘[i]f the (two) parties to a 
conflict (a) perceive themselves to be in a hurting stalemate and (b) perceive the possibility 
of a negotiated solution (a way out)’ (Zartman, 2000, p.229). 
Now, it is important to keep in mind that the identification of a ripeness moment does not 
mean that the entire process is going to be successful. This means that the fact that the conflict 
is ripe does not mean that it will lead necessarily, to a successful outcome, a negotiated 
resolution of the conflict. In this sense, ripeness theory is not predictive about what will 
happen after the dialogues start or when will it be a ripe moment in a conflict. However, 
ripeness theory can help ‘…identifying the elements necessary (even if not sufficient) for the 
productive inauguration of negotiations. This type of analytical prediction is the best that can 
be obtained in social science…’ (Zartman, 2000, p.228). 
The ripe moment just refers to the elements that make possible for the actors of the conflict 
to look towards a negotiated solution. These main elements (the Mutually Hurting Stalemate 
and the Way Out) are defined mainly by the perceptions of the actors and the objective reality 
they rely onto. The perception of the actors is fundamental to define the ripeness of the 
conflict, as it is actors’ perception what makes operative the ripe moment. In other words, 
‘…it is the perception of the objective condition, not the condition itself, that makes for an 
MHS’ (Zartman, 2000, p.229). That is to say that even though there is an objective reality, 
facts and evidence that would account for a ripe moment, it is the subjective perceptions of 
the actors of that reality what defines (by itself) if there is a ripe moment or not. However, as 
Zartman concedes, ‘…the greater the objective evidence, the greater the subjective 
perception of a stalemate and its pain is likely to be…’ (2000, p.230). This focus on the 
perception of the actors is shared by readiness theory which is why the analysis that will be 
carried out with this theoretical framework is going to focus on the official statements of both 
disputants to identify their perception of the conflict. 
Readiness theory, the ‘clarifying derivative of ripeness theory’ (Pruitt, 2005), adds a 
readiness stage before the ripe moment. This previous stage to the ripe moment, that Pruitt 
calls ‘readiness’, is a stage that allows the theory to ‘…look at the motives and perceptions 
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that make up ripeness on each side separately rather than focusing attention on joint states of 
mind such as a mutually hurting stalemate.’ (Pruitt, 2005, p.6).  
Moreover, readiness theory uses a multiple causal factor model. This means that the 
antecedents of the readiness stage, which are the perceptions of the actors of the conflict and 
the environmental conditions, are treated as variables that ‘…can substitute (that is, 
compensate) for less of another…’ (Pruitt, 2005, p.9). This results in the possibility of being 
able to explain that actors come to a readiness moment, through different processes, and 
having different main sources of the motivation to end the conflict. This model, Pruitt argues 
‘…fits reality better than ripeness theory, which requires a uniform hurting stalemate for all 
cases.’ (2005, p.9). 
In relation to this compensatory model approach, the two main antecedents of readiness, 
which parallel those of ripeness theory are Motivation to end the conflict or simply 
‘Motivation’ and Optimism about the outcome of negotiation or simply ‘Optimism’ (Pruitt, 
2015). To start, Motivation is what results from the disputants’ belief of being in a 
counterproductive conflict. This conception can be the result of the perception of the conflict 
as dysfunctional and/or the pressure of a third party. It is important to note that I will only 
focus on the description and the analysis of the first possibility, purposely leaving out the 
pressure of a third party as one of the antecedents of the motivation to end the conflict. This 
is due to space restrains and the active decision of focusing on the two main disputants of the 
conflict in this analysis. 
According to Pruitt (2005), there are three ways of perceiving a conflict as dysfunctional. 
First, the perception that the conflict is being lost or not being won, which would relate to 
the hurting stalemate proposed by Zartman. Second, the perceived cost of the conflict which 
could be related and operationalized by the number of casualties. Third, the perceived risk of 
running out of resources, escalation of the conflict or alienating the other party. In Pruitt’s 
view (2005), the greater the perception of failure, costs or risks, the greater the Motivation. 
When one of the disputants has Motivation, that means it is in a readiness stage. When all of 
the disputants involved have some degree of Motivation, there is a ripe moment to address 
the conflict through negotiation. It is important to note that both readiness and ripeness are 
considered to be states that can be more or less likely to achieve and not something that is 
for certain defined. 
The perception of a dysfunctional conflict could mean that there’s a crisis of tactics or a crisis 
of strategy. The main difference between these crises is that the former leads to an escalation 
of the conflict, whereas the latter will lead the disputants to have Motivation. According to 
Pruitt the initial aim of leaders, after perceiving the conflict is dysfunctional, is to ‘look for a 
better way to wage the conflict not to end it’ (2005, p.16). This initial perception of a conflict 
as dysfunctional is considered a crisis of tactics and is followed by a revision of those tactics, 
which can be done in three different ways: escalation of the conflict, co-optation and/or 
coalition building. Escalation refers to the tactics that are changed in order to achieve, 
militarily, the defeat of the adversary. Co-optation consists on making concessions to the 
opponents’ allies, so that they separate from them. Coalition building, refers to getting allies 
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or strengthening the bonds that already exist with the objective of improving military and 
political strength. Again, all of these revised tactics have the objective of continuing the 
conflict and it is only when these fail, that a crisis of strategy comes into frame. That is, the 
possibility to have a negotiated solution to the conflict. 
Conversely, when there is a crisis of strategy the conception of a dysfunctional conflict leads 
disputants to have Motivation. This means that, if each disputant has certain degree of 
Motivation, there is a degree of readiness, which means that the conflict has certain degree 
of ripeness, which in turn means that it is likely that disputants would want to look for a 
negotiated end to the conflict. To this effect, ‘[n]egotiation will only start if there is some 
degree of readiness on both sides and, hence, some degree of ripeness.’ (Pruitt, 2005, p.7).  
Now, the other main element in readiness theory is Optimism which refers to the perception 
of the disputants that a mutual agreement can be achieved. This element is based on ‘working 
trust’ and the perception of a valid spokesmen. Working trust refers to the belief that the 
disputant is also motivated to end the conflict through negotiation and so, it is willing to make 
concessions. In the same vain, Optimism also depends on the perception of having a valid 
spokesman on behalf of the disputant. A valid spokesman is a spokesman who can make 
meaningful commitments and concessions on behalf of its side that is, commitments and 
concessions that can and will be implemented (Pruitt, 2005, p.8). How Motivation, Optimism, 
Readiness and Ripeness make part of the same theoretical framework can be seen in Figure 
2. 
Figure 2 From strategy crisis in the conflict to ripeness of the conflict 
 
 
Finally, Pruitt (2005, pp.19-21) identifies five mechanisms of the Motivation that influence 
Optimism. This relation between both elements of the ripeness theory allows disputants to 
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increase the degree of Optimism and Motivation, beyond the initial moment of readiness. 
These mechanisms are: scaling down of aspirations, looking at new information of the enemy, 
wishful thinking, conciliatory spiral and third parties optimism. All of these mechanisms 
influence positively the optimism about the negotiating process. The scaling down of 
aspirations makes divergence between the disputants smaller. Looking at new information 
about the enemies challenges previous perceptions about them. Wishful thinking refers to 
selectively looking at positive information to reinforce the idea that the other party also wants 
to end the conflict through negotiation. Conciliatory spiral refers to the spiral that can sprout 
from signals given by one of the disputants of being open to negotiate. These signals can 
create a similar conciliatory response in the other disputant(s). Third parties optimism works 
similarly to the conciliatory spiral, as it can increase disputants’ optimism.  
It is important to note that the analysis that is going to be conducted here, is going to focus 
solely on the first two mechanisms that operate once there is Motivation. The main reason 
for this is that these mechanisms could be considered as the most influential to Optimism. In 
the case of the wishful thinking, it can be included already in the analysis of the process of 
changing the perception of ‘the Other’. The reason is that the change of perception of the 
enemy entails looking at new information to transform that idea of ‘the Other’ as an enemy, 
into someone my party can have a dialogue with. Regarding the signals between the 
disputants, this is a mechanism that refers to a certain degree of detail that the analysis 
pursued here, does not need. At the end, the signals and the conciliatory spiral will again 
reinforce the process of change of perception of ‘the Other’. Finally, the last mechanism is 
not going to be included because this thesis’ emphasis is on the two main disputants of the 
Colombian conflict around 2010s: FARC and Colombian government. 
 
 
2.3. Securitization/de-securitization theory and 
Ripeness/readiness theory as a theoretical framework to 
explain the change of strategies to fight coca plantation in 
Colombia.  
 
Building on these two general theories, I argue that coca eradication policies in Colombia are 
part of a securitization of drugs at an international, regional and national level. This means 
that coca plantation has been discursively constructed as a vital threat to ‘the Self’, which 
according to the securitization theory, allows and legitimizes the use of extraordinary 
methods to address the problem. In this case, these extraordinary methods have their extreme 
representation in militarization, with which the discursive war against the vital threat 
becomes a real war.  
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The approach to coca plantation envisioned in the 2016 Peace agreement is a move towards 
the de-securitization of coca plantation, an attempt to move coca plantation back to the realm 
of politics. This de-securitization, would promote an approach to the issue that focuses on 
causes and contexts that are not related to security, but to the needs, traditions and uses of 
the population that grow coca.  
In order to explain why it became de-securitized, we can draw on ripeness/readiness theory. 
In this sense, what ripeness/readiness theory gives to the analysis is the possibility to further 
understand the context of this change, what were the characteristics of the moment that made 
possible a peace negotiation. More specifically, ripeness/readiness theory allows to revise 
the changing aspirations and perceptions of ‘the Other’ between former enemies. I claim that 
this change of aspirations and of perception of ‘the Other’ is fundamental not just to increase 
the Optimism of both disputants to have a negotiated end to the conflict, but most importantly, 
to de-securitized a former securitized issue. Taking issues back to the realm of politics, which 
is what de-securitization is, implies and is done through reconsidering the perception of ‘the 
Other’ and reconsidering your own aspirations. 
The Colombian case thus represent an ideal scenario for theory-building whereby I integrate 
both of these theories into a single framework that can be applied to conflicts that are 
characterized by multiple ‘securitized’ threats. Figure 3 shows how the securitization/de-
securitization theoretical framework can merge with ripeness/readiness theory to help us 
explain why there is a change in the strategies to combat coca plantation in Colombia, during 
the Peace agreement.  
Figure 3. Transformation from Securitization to Desecuritization, through the 
ripeness/readiness moment of a conflict. 
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3. Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
The objective of this chapter is to use the theoretical model described before to explain the 
change of strategies to fight coca plantation in Colombia. Following this model, the analysis 
that is going to be developed here will start showing the securitization of coca plantation in 
Colombia. Then the chapter will focus on the analysis about the ripeness/readiness moment 
of Colombia’s internal armed conflict, which will be followed by the analysis of two of the 
Motivation’s mechanisms to influence Optimism. Finally, the last section of the chapter will 
explore the changes in the strategy to fight coca plantation proposed by the 2016 Peace 
agreement, as an attempt to de-securitize coca crops. 
Before continuing, it is important to keep in mind that this document does not have the 
objective of analyzing the peace dialogues between FARC and the Colombian government 
as such. Instead, the analysis will focus on the context and the perceptions of the actors that 
led them to change strategies against coca production.  
 
 
3.1. Successful securitization of coca plantation and the 
resulting extraordinary measures of eradication. 
 
The main objective of this section is to show how coca eradication policies in Colombia can 
be explained under the light of securitization/de-securitization theoretical framework. More 
specifically, this section’s goal is to show that coca eradication policies in Colombia before 
2016 have been securitized. I will identify the elements of securitization in the National 
Policy against Drugs. Then, I will make special emphasis on the consequences of the 
implementation of the policies that resulted from the successful securitizing move. 
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3.1.1. Securitization of coca plantation in the National Policy against Drugs. 
 
As mentioned before, the grammar of security entails the construction, through a securitizing 
speech act, of a vital threat to a Referent Object (‘Self'). The fact that the Referent Subject is 
defined as an existential threat, leads to a no return point, which the Securitizing actor 
presents to the audience(s) as the reason why certain special measures have to be taken. These 
components of securitization as well as its facilitating conditions will be explored in the 
National Policy against Drugs.  
The Securitizing actors are mainly the US and the Colombian government. To start, the US 
is a securitizing actor for two reasons. First, for its significant influence placing drugs as a 
security issue at an international level. This was already discussed in section 2.1.2. Second, 
due to its relation with Latin America and specifically with Colombia. In general terms we 
can say that the relation between the US and Latin America has been used to keep control 
over the region (Dominguez, 1999). During the Cold war this was evident in the way the US 
supported dictatorships and military forces in Latin America to keep communism from rising 
in such countries where inequality was and still is rampant. Moreover, Colombia has been 
one of the main receivers of US aid in Latin America since the 2000s. In fact, between 2000 
and 2006 Colombia was the largest recipient of US aid in Latin America (USAID, 2017) and 
remains to be among the top recipients in the region (Meyer, 2016). 
The Colombian government is the other securitizing actor because it has ratified both 1961 
and 1988 UN Conventions and implemented policies that show the militarized approach to 
coca plantation. On the one hand, one of Colombia’s declaration upon the signature of the 
1988 UN Convention was that the criminalization of the cultivation of coca ‘…must be 
harmonized with a policy of alternative development, having in mind the rights of the 
indigenous communities involved and the protection of the environment’ (United Nations 
Treaty Collection, 1988). Despite the reference of Colombian government to indigenous 
traditions, the fact that there is no resistance to the criminalization of coca plantation 
overlooks other uses of coca leaf, including those of indigenous communities. It is important 
to point out that, other countries with population with a long tradition of coca use, like Peru 
and Bolivia, were way much drastic in their positions regarding the criminalization of coca 
plantation in the 1988 UN Convention. For instance, Peru formulated an express reservation 
regarding the paragraph that included as a criminal offence the cultivation of coca, as it did 
not present ‘…the necessary clear distinction between licit and illicit cultivation [of coca]’ 
(UN Treaty Collection, 1988). Bolivia, for its part, expressed a reservation to that same 
paragraph, referring to the medical uses of coca, its wide consumption by Bolivia’s 
population and the difference between coca and cocaine (UN Treaty Collection, 1988).  
On the other hand, regarding the implementation of policies of a militarized approach to coca 
plantation, the best example of such an approach is Plan Colombia. For that matter, the first 
two Fiscal Years of US aid for this plan was exclusively focused on funding interdiction and 
eradication programs (AC/ACP) and giving support for aerial eradication (Air Wing) as can 
be seen in Figure 4. The following years, from FY2002 to FY2007, US aid for Plan Colombia 
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remained heavily focused on the military strategy, which besides the ones mentioned before, 
also included military financing (FMF), military education and training (IMET) and support 
for the nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining and related programs (NADR). It is only 
with FY2008 where assistance for security was reduced and economic support (ESF), which 
included funding alternative development projects, increased.  
According to the numbers in Figure 4, in total, over $9 billion of US assistance was given 
through Plan Colombia from 2000 to 2013. If we subtract the money given to the Department 
of State (DOD) through these years, as they ‘…could reallocate these funds throughout the 
year in accordance with changing needs.’ (Beittel, 2012, p.36); we have $7.340,9 billion with 
a known specific destination. 73% ($5.330,1 billion) of this money, was destined to fund 
military strategies to fight narcotics, including manual and aerial eradication, training, 
equipment transfers, etc. Indeed, ‘…policy attention naturally centres on where the money is 
[and] ‘soft issue’ funding was an inexpensive, secondary component of the proposal, and 
viewed as a necessary element to appease US non-governmental organizations and 
congressional Democrats.’ (Crandall, 2002, 165). Undoubtedly, Plan Colombia’s approach 
represents the results of the securitizing move that is done at an international level, leaded by 
the US through the UN; and implemented locally in Colombia.  
 
Figure 4. U.S assistance for Plan Colombia, Fiscal Years 2000-2013 (millions $) 
 
Source: Beittel, 2012, p.38 
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Continuing with the exploration of the components and facilitating conditions of 
securitization of coca plantation in Colombia, I turn now to identify if there is a securitizing 
speech act: the identification of an existential threat to ‘the Self’ and a way out of it. 
According to the language present in the official documents, policies and programs 
implemented before the Peace agreement; a construction of coca plantation as a vital threat 
to the Colombian state as such, its institutions and national security can be identified. In this 
light, the National Policy against Drugs states that the industry of illicit drugs has 
‘…undermined economic development, health and citizen security’ (My translation, 
República de Colombia, 2010, p.49). Likewise, this Policy states that, ‘…as a criminal 
phenomenon, drug trafficking […] has constituted a threat against [Colombia’s] institutional 
life.’ (My translation, República de Colombia, 2010, p.25). Here there is an emphasis on drug 
production and trafficking as the main threat. However, there is no reason to think that 
production and trafficking are considered different from coca plantation. In fact, the 
Territorial Consolidation Policy claims that: 
Today Colombia faces a central challenge in its public policies, which is the consolidation of the 
effective presence of state institutions on the territories with the highest historical incidence of illegal 
armed organizations, illicit crops and drug trafficking gangs, which are the major threats to national 
and citizen security [my italics], and have prevented Colombia from reaching its growth potential and 
prosperity’ (My translation, UACT, 2014a, p.22) 
In this sense, drug trafficking, armed organizations and illicit crops are put at the same level 
and are considered ‘major threats’ (Referent Subject) to national and citizen security 
(Referent Object). This definition of ‘the Self’ explains why the policies and programs to 
fight coca plantation make part of a broader legal framework that focus mainly on security. 
In this sense, the 2010 Policy of Manual Eradication was conceived to support the objective 
of the Policy of Defense and Democratic Security.  
Furthermore, the construction of coca crops as a menace can also be evidenced in the 2008-
launched campaign ‘La mata que mata’. The name of the campaign literally means the bush 
that kills, making reference to coca, marijuana and poppy crops and it had the objective of 
persuading people from growing these crops (Lewin, 2009). The campaign’s script reads: 
If you do not grow the bush that kills, many things will change in the countryside. The mines will 
disappear, the rivers of blood will dry up, the rain of bullets will cease, the people will weep with joy, 
the dark nights will end, displaced people will return to the countryside, healthier crops will grow. 
Coca, poppy and marijuana kill. Do not grow the bush that kills (My translation, IMAKIFILMS, 2013) 
With this campaign, it becomes evident that coca crops, and not just the general drug problem, 
are presented as a vital threat. Indeed, this campaign presents coca, along with the other illicit 
crops, as crops that kill. Furthermore, these crops are the reason there is violence (‘rivers of 
blood’, ‘rain of bullets’, ‘dark nights’) and the reason why people are displaced from their 
homes and cannot grow ‘healthier crops’. The demonization and stigmatization of the plant 
is unmistakable in the image that is used in the videos of the campaign, which can be seen in 
Figure 5. In sum, the campaign presents illicit crops as an existential threat, it kills and it is 
the cause of rural violence.  
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Figure 5. Representation of a coca bush in the campaign 'La mata que mata' 
 
Source: IMAKIFILMS, 2013. 
To sum up, in the programs and policies that address coca plantations before 2016, coca crops 
are discursively built as a vital threat. On the one hand, coca crops kill, which is why they 
are a threat to citizen security. On the other hand, coca crops make part of and fuel a criminal 
industry, which is a vital threat to Colombia’s institutions and national security. Along with 
this discursive construction of an existential threat personified in coca, poppy and marijuana 
crops; is the definition of these crops as illicit. Indeed, article 375 of Colombia’s Criminal 
Code prohibits the cultivation, conservation or funding of ‘…marijuana plantations or any 
other plant from which cocaine, morphine, heroin or any other drug that generates 
dependence; may be produced’ (My translation, Congreso de Colombia, 2000).  
Both the construction of coca plantation as a vital threat and its criminalization, led to policies 
that are focused on the complete eradication of these crops. It is hardly surprising that official 
policies and plans share the objective and are mainly focused on eliminating illicit crops. 
This is what the securitizing actors present as a way to overcome the existential threat to ‘the 
Self’, to eliminate the crops. In line with this, the second objective of the National Policy 
against Drugs is to ‘articulate strategies for the elimination of illicit crops’ (My translation, 
2010, p.49).  
The objective of eliminating coca crops are reflected on the focus given to eradication in the 
official policies and plans, over alternative development strategies. These strategies have 
been present in Colombia since the early 1980s, but have been only complementary tools to 
the repressive approach that has been implemented since 1994 and that was strengthened 
with Plan Colombia (Zorro, 2005, p.116). The use of alternative development as a 
complementary tool can be evidenced in the place it has in the strategy of voluntary manual 
eradication. In this case, the access to programs of alternative development is conditioned to 
a complete eradication. For instance, one of the principles of 2010 Manual Eradication Policy 
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is that eradication must be a previous condition to begin any intervention regarding 
alternative development in the community (DNP, 2010, p.27). To this effect, the document 
that regulates eradication and post-eradication strategies, calls for a certification of ‘zero 
illicit crops’ as a condition for growers to get into the process of post-eradication (UACT, 
2012). 
Besides the voluntary manual eradication, there are forceful oriented strategies that keep the 
focus on eradication. These strategies are extraordinary measures related to the cultivation of 
coca, which are justified by the discursive construction of drug and coca as an existential 
threat. The strategies used to accomplish forceful eradication of illicit crops in Colombia are 
the mobile groups of eradication, the manual forced eradication made directly by the National 
Police and the aerial herbicide fumigation. The reasons why these measures are extraordinary 
is something that is going to be addressed with more detail in subsection 3.1.2.  
Finally, regarding the existence of an audience to legitimize the international securitizing 
move, the enabling audience in the case of the policies implemented is the Colombian 
Congress, which sanctioned Plan Colombia and the Laws that made possible the 
incorporation of the UN Conventions in the national legal system. Table 2 presents the 
components and facilitating conditions of securitization, which were just identified in the 
strategies used to fight coca plantation before the 2016 Peace agreement. 
 
Table 2. Securitization components and analysis of Colombian strategy to fight coca 
plantations before the Peace agreement 
 
  
 Securitization Colombian strategy to fight coca plantation before the Peace 
agreement 
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
ts
 
1. Securitizing speech act  
2. Securitizing Actor  
3. Audience(s) 
4. [Results] 
1. Coca crops are illicit. Cultivating coca crop is a crime. 
2. UN, US and the Colombian state 
3. Colombian Congress 
4. Exceptional measures: Manual forced eradication and 
aerial herbicide fumigation 
F
a
ci
li
ta
ti
n
g
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
4. Grammar of security 
(RO, RS, way out) 
5. Social conditions: 
position of authority of 
the SA regarding the 
audience(s) 
6. [Context] ‘features of 
the alleged threats that 
either facilitate or 
impede the 
securitization’ 
5. Coca, as all the other illicit crops (Reference subject) 
kill and are a threat to Colombian institutions and 
national and citizen security (Referent Object). This is 
why they have to be completely eliminated. 
6. UN 
US’ position of influence in internal affairs of Latin 
America, especially in those of Colombia 
Colombian Government, empowered to take decisions 
on behalf of the Colombian population. 
7. Colombia was almost a collapsed state due to the 
incursion of the drug economy. 
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3.1.2. Results of the successful securitizing move: extraordinary measures to 
eliminate coca crops 
 
The most visible result of a successful securitizing move are extraordinary measures. These 
extraordinary measures are allowed to be implemented due to acceptance of the securitizing 
move by the audience, which legitimizes what are deemed to be needed measures. This 
subsection will focus in highlighting why the eradication strategies are extraordinary 
measures.  
The idea of facing an existential threat means that your existence is at such risk that it is you 
(Referent Object) or them (Reference Subject). This dichotomy puts the audience in the 
position to accept what otherwise would not be allowed. Strategies of coca crops eradication 
are not different, which is why they have continued despite the results they have had. The 
consequences of these strategies can be put in three categories: (1) they ignore growers’ 
livelihoods, (2) they marginalize indigenous traditions and (3) they are harmful to 
campesinos- small-scale peasants. 
First, eradication strategies ignore that growers’ livelihoods depend on coca plantation. 
Despite the fact that all the policies make emphasis on the ‘vulnerability’ of coca growers to 
the threat of illicit crops (UACT, 2012), the strategies implemented do not seem to recognize 
the position of the growers. In this sense, the fact that campesinos who grow coca because 
they cannot make a living with any other crop; is completely overlooked with ‘zero illicit 
crops’ condition to access alternative productive projects and the criminalization of 
cultivation. To this effect, the principle of ‘effective prosecution’ of the 2010 Manual 
Eradication Policy states that when forced eradication takes place, a penal process must start 
for the crime of conserving or funding illicit plantations, as well as forfeiture (DNP, 2010, 
p.28). This means that growers who do not comply with ‘voluntary’ eradication are 
considered criminals, regardless of their reasons and the actual possibility they have to make 
a living growing other crops. 
Second, eradication strategies marginalize indigenous traditions. This is closely related to the 
fact that indigenous communities were not an enabling audience of the securitizing move. 
The fact that chewing coca leaf, ‘…a ritual and a cultural expression of Andean indigenous 
identity’ (Hesselroth, 2015, p.68), was specifically banned in 1961 UN Convention; speaks 
about the power structure of banning what the ‘Self’ considers immoral. The ‘Self’ is then 
represented by a western elite, which can be represented by specific countries, like the US or 
national elites from less powerful countries, like the Andean countries.  
Third, eradication strategies are harmful to campesinos. The consequences of state 
interventions to forcefully eradicate coca crops -mainly but not solely focused on aerial 
spraying of glyphosate- are: forced displacement of peasants (Palacios, 2012; Rincón-Ruíz 
and Kallis, 2013); increasing violence on the territory (Rincón-Ruiz, Correa, León and 
Williams, 2016; Ross, 2004); health risks due to contamination of food crops and water 
sources (Defensoría del pueblo, 2003; Vargas, 2004), displacement of crops to other 
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vulnerable areas (Lupu, 2004 ; Rincón-Ruíz and Kallis, 2013) and deforestation (Chadid et 
al., 2015; Dávalos, Sánchez, and Armenteras, 2016). 
The reactions to the banning of glyphosate in Colombia in 2015, which was by the way, the 
last Andean country to do so (Neuman, 2015); evidence the extraordinariness of the measures 
and the resistances that arise to change a securitized approach that has been institutionalized. 
After 20 years of use of glyphosate spraying of coca plantations from US-piloted crop dusters, 
Santos banned its use ‘…following a World Health Organisation decision to classify it as a 
carcinogen’ (The Guardian, 2016). Despite this, ‘…conservative critics warned that without 
glyphosate Colombia would soon be awash in coca’ (The Guardian, 2016). Along the same 
lines, ‘…the United States had pressed the Colombian government to continue the spraying 
program’ (Neuman, 2015) before the decision was taken. 
To claim that the elimination of coca crops is more important than peasants’ health, which is 
what a claim for continuing aerial eradication is; is definitely an evidence of strategies that 
have come above politics and rules. The fact that this has been done for such a long time, 
regardless of the critiques for the negative consequences it had for the environment and 
people’s health, shows the institutionalization and legitimization of extraordinary measures 
achieved by the securitizing move. Moreover, the fact that there are sectors that still support 
the measure even when it has been officially proved to have harmful effects, shows the degree 
of polarization between ‘the Self’ and the threatening Other. 
In relation to this, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde argue that ‘[s]ecuritization is not fulfilled 
only by breaking rules […] nor solely by existential threats […] but by cases of existential 
threats that legitimize the breaking of rules’ (1998, p.25). Indeed, the consequences of the 
strategies to eliminate coca plantation are accepted due to the emergency call of the 
‘securitizing move’ that allows the securitizing actors (the US and the Colombian state) to 
go beyond moral limits. In other words, the violence that these strategies entail for 
campesinos and indigenous communities in Colombia, has been made legitimate or at least 
bearable to the enabling audience, due to the success of the securitizing move. 
Now that I have identified the securitization of coca plantation in the policies and strategies 
implemented before the Peace agreement, the following two sections (3.2 and 3.3) will use 
ripeness/readiness theory in order to explain what happened for the peace negotiations to 
begin. 
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3.2. Readiness of the actors to attempt a de-securitization of 
strategies to fight coca plantation in Colombia 
 
This section will explore the concepts of crisis of tactics and crisis of strategy in the 1999 
and 2012 peace dialogues and the concepts of Motivation and Optimism in the perception of 
the conflict of Colombian government and FARC. This means that the section will identify 
if the disputants were at a readiness stage and thus if the conflict was ripe: if they both had 
Motivation and Optimism in the 1999 and the 2012 peace dialogues.  
With this objective in mind, I will first succinctly mention (a detailed analysis is available in 
Appendix 1) why 1999 peace talks can be considered a result of a crisis of tactics of the 
conflict- an attempt made by the disputants to improve their position in the conflict. Then, 
the section will focus on 2012 peace talks and the readiness of the actors then, the ripeness 
of the conflict. According to the evidence, I claim that 2012 peace talks are the result of a 
crisis of strategy. 
Given the analysis of Appendix 1 Crisis of tactics in 1999 Peace negotiations in Colombia, I 
argue that the 1999 Peace talks between FARC and Pastrana, the president of Colombia at 
the time; were the result of a crisis of tactics. This means that both actors used peace talks to 
find new ways of continuing the ongoing conflict through escalation and coalition building.  
The 1999 Peace talks were the result of a crisis of tactics because the conflict was not ripe: 
not FARC nor Colombia’s government were at a readiness stage. On the one hand, FARC 
didn’t consider the conflict was dysfunctional because the end of the 1990s was in fact their 
best moment as a guerrilla and the period they were closer from their military and political 
objective. Accordingly, FARC did not have Optimism either. On the other hand, Colombian 
government considered the conflict was dysfunctional. Indeed, Colombia was at risk of being 
a failed state. However, the clear power imbalance between both disputants could hinder the 
possibility of Optimism about having a negotiated end to the conflict. Furthermore, following 
Pruitt (2005), as this perception of dysfunctionality of the conflict was initial for Colombia’s 
state, it is probable that it would lead to a revision of tactics rather than a revision of strategies.  
In contrast with the 1999 Peace talks, in the 2012 Peace dialogues, Colombia’s government 
and FARC had some degree of Motivation and Optimism that would show they had some 
degree of readiness and thus, that the conflict had some degree of ripeness. 
In the case of FARC, it is fair to say that in 2012 there was more ground for them to perceive 
the conflict as dysfunctional in comparison with 1999 Peace negotiations. To start, it is likely 
that FARC perceived increasing costs of the conflict, due to successful attacks conducted by 
the Colombian National Army, like ‘Operación Fenix’ or ‘Operación Jaque’. With these 
attacks Colombia’s Army managed to kill one of the members of FARC’s secretariat ‘Raúl 
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Reyes’ in 2008 (El Tiempo, 2016f) and ‘Alfonso Cano’, FARC’s top leader in November 
2011 (El Tiempo, 2011b).  
These blows to top leaders of FARC had psychological consequences in FARC’s guerrilleros. 
Aware of this, Colombia’s government launched in 2010 a campaign to promote their 
demobilization (Revista Semana, 2014b). According to the data of Colombia’s governments, 
from 2003 to June 30 2010, 15.852 guerrilleros of FARC demobilized and 45% of this 
demobilizations occurred between 2006 and 2008 (El Tiempo, 201-). Besides the risk of 
having increased demobilizations, there was also the risk of alienating again the disputant. In 
fact, the period between 2002 and 2010 was a period when the Colombian state not only 
increased its militarization and strived for the goal of eliminating guerrillas, it was also the 
period when FARC lost their recognition as a political subversive group, to be called instead 
‘terrorists’10. 
Accordingly, FARC’s perception about the conflict matched the context. In this respect, 
FARC were aware of their losses in the conflict but were still proud of their capacity to resist 
it and fight back. Along these lines, in 2012 Timochenko said:  
FARC and the Colombian popular movement as a whole, were successful, not without errors or regrettable 
losses, in face of a campaign of devastation that tried to eliminate us in only one year and that already adds 
more than a decade without being able to wipe us off the map (My translation, FARC, 2012) 
According to this, it seems reasonable to claim that in 2012 FARC perceived the conflict was 
dysfunctional due to the increasing costs and risks of military operations and the perception 
of not winning the conflict. 
In the case of Colombia’s government, although there was a feeling of triumphalism after the 
military blows given to FARC, there were also reasons for this disputant to consider the 
conflict was dysfunctional. On the one hand, despite the increased control of the Colombian 
state in urban areas, the guerrilla still hold back in some rural areas. In this sense, analysts 
stated that the internal conflict was ‘bogged down’ (Ávila-Martínez, 2009, p.2). To add up 
to this perception of not winning the conflict, ‘…the number of known and suspected 
terrorists killed, captured, or surrendered fell.’ (U.S. State Department, 2012, p.158).  
The risks of the conflict also seemed to increase: ‘…the number of attacks and casualties 
rose…’ as FARC reverted their tactics back to guerra de guerrillas- and focused on attacks 
‘rather than large unit encounters’ (U.S. State Department, 2012, p.158). Another increasing 
risk was the unsustainable high expenditure on Defense. In point of fact, between 2002 and 
2015, the expenditure on Defense of Colombia’s government remained around 3,5% and 4% 
of Colombia’s GDP11 (Otero-Prada, 2016, p.49) without an achievable defeat of guerrillas 
on the near horizon.  
According to this, I can argue that both disputants had a certain degree of Motivation. 
Moreover, it is also likely that both disputants had a certain degree of Optimism as they 
                                                            
10 For a more detailed analysis on how different aspects in 2002 came together to change the perception of 
FARC from a subversive group to a terrorist, see Appendix 1. 
11 Colombia is among the countries with largest ratio of military spending to GDP (González, 2014) 
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perceived the disputant’s representative was a valid spokesman. This can be evidenced in the 
way both disputants refer to their adversary when the official negotiations started, as a group 
that has shown so far seriousness in the process (El Tiempo, 2012). To this extent, both the 
Colombian government and FARC had certain degree of Optimism to continue with the 
negotiations that started in 2012.  
 
 
3.3. Mechanisms of the Motivation to end the conflict to 
influence Optimism in a dialogue process. Analysis of 
Colombia’s government and FARC. 
 
Now that I have stablished that in 2012 there was a crisis of strategy and that both actors had 
certain degree of readiness, because they have some degree of Motivation and Optimism; is 
time to take the next step in the analysis. In this sense, this section will focus on the analysis 
of two of the mechanisms that Motivation has to influence Optimism: the scaling down of 
aspirations and the change of perception of the enemy. 
 
3.3.1. Scaling down of disputants’ aspirations 
 
Let us start the analysis addressing the scaling down of disputants’ aspirations. According to 
the evidence, this scaling down of aspirations can be identified in Colombia’s government as 
well as FARC, in at least two aspects: the conditions to start a peace negotiation and the goals 
of the armed conflict.  
First, the conditions to start a peace negotiation. After the failure of the 1999 peace 
negotiations, which was unilaterally ended by Pastrana, FARC continued with their claim of 
wanting a political end to the conflict. By contrast, a hard –line approach to the conflict came 
with Uribe’s mandate. This new approach focused on militarily recovering national territory 
from terrorists while trying to have secret meetings with FARC to start a peace process.  
In the case of FARC, they have always discursively12 insisted on their willingness to go back 
to the peace dialogues with the conditions that were previously accorded in San Vicente del 
Caguán. In this sense, during Uribe’s mandate their conditions were, to sign a ‘humanitarian 
exchange’ (FARC, 2003), the demilitarization of the departments of Caquetá and Putumayo 
(FARC, 2003), similarly to the DMZ Pastrana granted them previously. Finally, they insisted 
                                                            
12 I mean in their official Comunicados they have always insisted in wanting a political solution to the conflict. 
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that being recognized as a belligerent force, would be a great step towards peace (Fundación 
Seguridad y Democracia, 2007).  
Now, let us turn to Colombia’s government side. As shown before, Uribe’s mandate 
characterized for having a hardline, military approach towards FARC. In this sense, Uribe’s 
objective was to militarily defeat FARC, as 1999 peace dialogues failed. This was backed-
up by having a discourse which consistently denied Colombia was in an internal armed 
conflict and defining FARC as terrorists. This resulted in a huge polarization of public 
opinion. Indeed, Leal-Buitrago (My translation, 2015) observes that ‘the disregard of an 
internal armed conflict, describing it as a terrorist menace, lead to a visceral hate of FARC 
by public opinion and the need of exterminating them’. This, he continues, lead to a vicious 
political polarization inclined towards Uribe. 
However, according to information released in 2014, that harsh military approach towards 
FARC was not the only strategy Uribe used. Between 2002 and 2010, Uribe also explored 
the possibility of starting peace dialogues with FARC. Public talks between the Colombian 
government and FARC were about the exchange of what FARC called ‘war prisoners’ 
(Revista Semana, 2014a). Uribe’s position about the exchange reinforced the relentless 
approach of his mandate against guerrillas. In this sense, he assured that a humanitarian 
accord, an exchange of war prisoners in FARC’s language, would only be possible in a peace 
process with cessation of hostilities. Moreover there was a key difference in what both sides 
considered as an exchange. On one side, Uribe’s approach to the exchange was to set free 
FARC prisoners who were incarcerated for rebellion for them to reintegrate to civil life. On 
the other side, FARC expected that prisoners that were left free were allowed to come back 
to FARC, as a guerrillero. (Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, 2007). Both their approaches 
appeared as unacceptable for the other side. 
Additionally to this tough approach, Uribe had secret contacts with ‘Catatumbo’, one of 
FARC leaders; trying to start a peace process with them (Coronell, 2014). Despite the 
repeated efforts to meet FARC (26 accepted by the former president), FARC refused to do 
so as they alleged a lack of guarantees (Las2orillas, 2014). This concern remained even after 
Uribe, supposedly offered FARC the demilitarization of two municipalities in Colombia, 
security for FARC representatives and a bilateral ceasefire (Coronell, 2014). The only aspect 
Uribe’s government was not willing to change was to acknowledge that Colombia was in an 
internal armed conflict and not just a victim of a terrorist menace (Revista Semana, 2014a, 
Las2orillas, 2014). This specific aspect is going to be addressed when analyzing the 
mechanism that challenges the perception of the enemy. 
To sum up, Uribe was open to concede some of the conditions demanded by FARC, 
demilitarization and bilateral ceasefire, for instance. However, there was one condition he 
would not concede to start a peace process: FARC’s cease of hostilities and acknowledging 
there was an internal armed conflict. Uribe argued the cease of hostilities was the way FARC 
could show they were not terrorists. In this sense, only when a ceasefire was in place, the 
government would consider the possibility of considering FARC as something different from 
terrorists and maybe considering the existence of an internal armed conflict. Conversely, 
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FARC considered that request a lack of respect, as they consider their armed organization 
has a political raison d’être, and they are fighting to achieve those political objectives. As 
Monojojoy, one of the founders of FARC and its top leader until he died of natural reasons 
in 2008, said in his last interview:  
They [the government] have not payed attention to us. They want peace of people on their knees and 
that does not work with us. We respect to be respected. We are not going to spend 50 years [fighting] 
to say [at the end] that armed struggle is outdated (FRIU 2011)  
Indeed, Uribe’s conditions were more towards achieving a process of demobilization, and 
not a peace process that would include any political agenda (Revista Semana, 2005).  
In 2012, when both Santos and Timochenko officially announced the peace dialogues, they 
referred to the conditions of the peace negotiations in the following way. The Colombian 
government emphasized that there would not be any military concessions, so no demilitarized 
zone in Colombia and no halt of military activities against FARC. (Presidencia de la 
República de Colombia, 2012). FARC also continued with their military activities when the 
peace dialogues started; but did not appreciate the fact that the Colombian government had 
taken the immovable decision of not making any military ‘concessions’ (FARC, 2012). This, 
according to Timochenko’s speech (FARC, 2012), showed that FARC was being besieged 
to force them drop their political aspirations. However, he insisted, FARC were optimists.  
According to Pruitt, one of the mechanisms of the motivation to end the conflict to increase 
optimism, is the scaling down of aspirations. However, what I have showed previously shows 
there is no uniform scaling down of aspirations. Instead, it seems like optimism can result of 
a mixture between aspirations scaling down and up for the disputants. What appears to be the 
most important here is that the aspirations that are being scaled down seem less important 
than those that are being scaled up by the disputants.  
So we can explain this agreement over a different set of conditions, some of which had scaled 
up for the Colombian government, in the following way. Colombian government’s 
aspirations regarding negotiating conditions went up in the military field. These conditions 
seemed more important for the Colombian government, due to the failure of 1999 peace talks 
and the need to differentiate the current process from that one. On the other hand, 
government’s aspirations went down regarding the recognition of the existence of an internal 
armed conflict, which was unbearable for the previous government. Meanwhile, FARC 
scaled down their aspirations in the military field but kept high what appears as the most 
important condition for them: to be recognized as an insurgent group which was a possibility 
that opened with the public recognition of the existence of an internal armed conflict in 
Colombia.  
In this sense, what seems important is not the aspirations’ scaling down per se, but the 
possibility of finding a way in which each disputant can scale down some aspirations but 
keep the essence of those that seem untouchable. Now let us turn to the analysis of the 
changes regarding the goals of the armed conflict.  
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Now, the scaling down of goals of the armed conflict.  
It is fair to state that there is a difference between FARC’s aspirations in 1964, when a group 
of peasants decided to arm themselves to fight Colombia’s social and economic injustices 
(FARC, 1964), and FARC’s aspirations to officially start a peace process in 2012. In this 
sense, in their 1964 Agrarian Program, FARC stated that they wanted a change of regime. A 
change they were forced to strive for through armed revolution. Armed revolution to fight 
for the power (FARC, 1964). FARC, as all the guerrillas from mid-twentieth century in Latin 
America, fought for taking over the power of the State to transform it into a socialist State 
(Uribe Calderón, 2007, p. 228). The success of Cuban revolution, was of great importance to 
nurture this idea of guerrilla’s fighting being a feasible way to take the power and change the 
regime.  
In general, I can say that the start of 2012 peace process, represented for FARC a scale down 
of aspirations. FARC aspirations went from striving to achieve social justice through a 
forceful establishment of a socialist state in Colombia; to achieve social justice through peace 
dialogues. Hence, the scaling down of aspirations is specifically about Colombia becoming 
a socialist state through a military revolution. However, there is not- at least not discursively- 
a change about FARC aspirations for social justice. In fact, social justice, along with these 
other concepts: sovereignty, true democracy and democratic peace; are present at least in one 
of the Comunicados released every year, from 1964-199213, to 2017 (FARC, 1993, 1995, 
1997, 2002b, 2005, 2008b, 2010b, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2013a, 2016, 2017b). 
Now let us turn to the case of Colombia’s government. In general terms again, its main 
objective went from defeating terrorists, the name used to refer to guerrillas; to achieve peace. 
The objective of defeating guerrillas corresponded to the two mandates of Uribe, who 
characterized for being highly militarized14.  
In this sense, between 2002 and 2010 Uribe persistently referred to the effort and the sacrifice 
of Colombian population as a whole, and of course the armed forces; to defeat terrorists. 
Accordingly, Uribe claimed in 2005 that: 
We have paid a very high sacrifice of our soldiers, of our policemen, of our citizens. And with our 
decision of defeating terrorism and implement that decision every day, we are going to honor that 
sacrifice so that new generations of Colombians can live happily in this country (My translation, 
Presidencia de la República, 2005) 
This clear goal of defeating guerrillas was accompanied, after the killing of Raúl Reyes in 
2008, with a strong ‘triumphalism’, the feeling of being very close to achieve that ultimate 
objective (Ávila-Martínez, 2009, p.5). In this sense, the commander of the Colombian Armed 
Forces in 2009, General Padilla, assured that ‘…we are in the end of the end, […] in the path 
to victory’ (Padilla, 5 June 2009 quoted by Granada, Restrepo and Vargas, 2009, p. 31). Even 
Santos, who was Uribe’s Minister of Defense at the time, said ‘we have to crush the beast of 
                                                            
13 The first politic declaration of FARC was the Agrarian Program of guerrilleros, in 1964. However, this 
Program was not published online until 1993 (for obvious reasons regarding access and development of 
internet). It is not until 1992, that FARC started to periodically release public Comunicados. 
14 This can be seen with more detail in Appendix 1 Crisis of tactics in 1999 Peace negotiations in Colombia 
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terrorism’ referring to guerrillas. Then he continued with the opening of the presentation of 
the strategy that was intended to recover the last territories FARC had: ‘the beast in wounded 
and we have to give the final blow, to take it to the point of no return’ (El Tiempo, 2009). 
Needless to say, ‘the beast’ never died. Instead, FARC reorganized itself and although 
military forces recovered urban space from them, the subversive group kept its high military 
capacity (Ávila-Martínez, 2009, p.6). 
In September 2012, Santos made official the initiation of peace dialogues with FARC in La 
Habana, Cuba. With his speech, he made a differentiation between the previous objective of 
defeating the enemy and that of achieving peace. He said: 
We can talk today about peace due to the successes of our Military Forces and our Police, and due to 
the increasing presence of the State in all the national territory.  
We can talk today about peace thanks to the daily effort of our soldiers and our policemen, to whom 
I want to pay tribute in this moment.  
I know what war is because I was Ministry of Defense in a crucial moment and knew first-hand the 
sacrifice of our men.  
We can talk today about peace because the vision of my government is comprehensive: we DO NOT 
combat for the sake of combating; we combat to achieve peace. (My translation, Presidenncia de la 
República de Colombia, 2012) 
 
In this sense, from 2012, the objective is not anymore defeating the enemy, but achieving 
peace. This is a key differentiation anytime it opens the possibility to accomplish the 
objective through a different path. A path that does not need the military victory and the 
surrender of the enemy. In other words, once the goal is peace and not defeating the enemy 
per se, negotiating seems a plausible route.  
The change of objectives of both the disputants, is of fundamental importance as it 
redefines or clarifies what victory is for each of them. This redefinition is crucial anytime 
that, as Ghosn has pointed out, negotiating with the rival ‘…can be costly for it not only 
could be seen as a means of acknowledging the enemy but also as betraying those who have 
given their lives against the enemy’ (2010, p.1060). Wholly aware of this, the day both 
disputants made officially public that they were having dialogues to find an end to the 
conflict; they redefined what victory was. Santos did so focusing on the objective of 
achieving peace, whereas Timochenko’s speech ended with the exclamation ‘We’ve sworn 
to defeat and we will defeat!’ (FARC, 2012c). Peace negotiations were indeed, considered a 
way to defeat and accomplish their objective. Finally, Table 3 succinctly shows the analysis 
just done about the scaling down of the disputants’ aspirations. 
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Table 3. Scaling down of aspirations. Colombia’s State and FARC 
 
3.3.2. Change of disputants’ perceptions of the enemy 
 
Having just showed the scaling down of Colombia’s government and FARC’s aspirations, 
let’s now turn our attention to the disputants’ perception of each other. Specifically, I will 
address how the perception of ‘the Other’ changed from enemy to a political adversary.  
As an insurgent group, FARC’s enemy is the establishment and Colombia’s state. Now, 
regarding FARC’s perception of that enemy, it is important to note that there are 
differentiations between FARC’s perception of the Colombian State, the politicians that 
represent it, the cadres of the Army and the soldiers they fight on the battle field.  
On the one hand, there are the degrading perceptions about the enemy. In this sense, FARC 
refer to the Colombian state, as ‘paramilitary’ (FARC, 1997, 2002a, 2005, 2008c, 2008d, 
2011, 2012a) and ‘terrorist’ (FARC, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2002b, 
2008d, 2010, 2012a), for implementing policies, like that of National security, that 
criminalizes social protests and considers people and their own national brothers as enemies 
that have to be crushed in an internal war (FARC, 2008d). Likewise, the Colombian State is 
perceived as paramilitary and terrorist for promoting a counterinsurgent strategy, developed 
by the Army, which objective is to defeat guerrilla through the killing of civilians (FARC, 
1999).  
In regard to the politicians who have represented that State so far, FARC consider them an 
elite who are responsible for initiating and continuing the internal armed conflict. In this 
sense, FARC refer to them as ‘dominant predatory class’ (FARC, 1964), ‘exclusionary 
 Colombia’s State FARC-EP 
Motivation to end the conflict 
1. Scale down 
of aspirations 
(that are not 
considered 
fundamental) 
(a) Conditions to have peace dialogues 
From (2002-2010): DMZ, bilateral 
ceasefire, cease of hostilities to open up the 
possibility of not being terrorists. 
To (Santos): recognition of internal armed 
conflict in Colombia, no DMZ, no bilateral 
ceasefire or humanitarian exchange. 
(b) Objectives 
From ‘defeating FARC’ (Uribe, 2009), 
‘give FARC the final blow’ (Santos, 2009) 
to achieve peace with FARC (Santos, 2012)  
 
Redefinition/Clarification of what 
victory is: ‘We fight to achieve peace’ 
(Santos, 2012) 
(a) Conditions to have peace dialogues 
From (2002-2010): Humanitarian 
exchange, DMZ, Bilateral ceasefire. 
To: recognition of internal armed conflict 
in Colombia, no DMZ, no bilateral 
ceasefire or humanitarian exchange.  
(b) Objectives 
From ‘change the regime through an 
armed revolution’ (FARC, 1964) to ‘have 
deep modifications of the existing order’ 
(Timochenko, 2012) 
 
Redefinition/Clarification of what 
victory is: having a real democracy with 
social justice  
 
40 
 
oligarchy’ (FARC, 1993, 1997, 2008c, 2012b, 2013a), ‘corrupt oligarchy’ (FARC, 2008b) 
or ‘reactionary, bloodthirsty, terrorist and submissive [oligarchy]’ (FARC, 2010a). 
Accordingly, for FARC, the oligarchy is guilty of Colombia’s internal armed conflict and 
have been accomplice of Colombia’s surrender to neoliberal and foreign policies.  
Similarly, regarding the cadres of the Army, FARC perceives them as ‘unpatriotic’ (FARC, 
2012) and ‘mercenaries of the oligarchy and the empire’ (FARC, 2008c) for defending 
foreign interests against Colombian people. So too, according to FARC, the Colombian 
Army characterizes for ‘…violating human rights and promoting paramilitaries, who 
massacre defenseless civilian population and send tons of cocaine to the US’ (FARC, 2000). 
On the other hand, there is the perception of ‘the Other’ as someone who is not completely 
responsible of her/his actions. In this sense, FARC perceive Colombian Army soldiers as 
‘brothers’. A study pursued by Medina-Arbeláez (2008) about the socialization of people in 
illegal armed groups in Colombia, shows this stark difference between soldiers and the other 
representatives of the establishment FARC opposed to. According to the testimonies of 
FARC ex-combatants, soldiers are ‘inocent’, ‘deceived’, ‘poor’, ‘campesinos’ and ‘equal to 
the guerrilla’ (Medina-Arbeláez, 2008, p.37). One of them described that they were told in 
FARC, when they were about to fight the National Army, that ‘…they are campesinos, just 
like you, they are sons of poor people. They are human beings who need [to get into the 
Army] because they need to get the military passbook, or some others because they are 
unemployed’ (Medina-Arbeláez, 2008, p.38). The FARC ex-combatant even describes that, 
before, when the cadres of the Army had distinctive badges, they were told to kill them, 
instead of the soldiers Medina-Arbeláez, 2008, p.38). 
Some of these perceptions have changed due to the start of the peace dialogues in 2012 and 
its successful closures15 in 2016. According to the official speeches of Timochenko in 2012 
and 2016, there was a change of some of the perceptions of the enemy. The main change is 
the perception of the Colombian state, which he concedes as a ‘courageous interlocutor, 
capable of sorting out with composure the pressures and incitements from warmongering 
sectors’ (El Tiempo, 2016e), of having ‘proved intentions’ to build the peace agreement (El 
Tiempo, 2016e). 
In the case of the political elite, FARC’s perception slightly changed. The main difference is 
that the concept oligarchy, was not used by Timochenko in any of the discourses of 2012 or 
2016. However, the concept is still used in the public Comunicados FARC publish in their 
webpage, but there is a difference on the way the concept is used. In the Comunicados after 
2012, oligarchy mainly appears as part of the final statements like ‘against oligarchy, for the 
people!’ that goes along with other claims like ‘against imperialism, for the country!’ (FARC, 
2012b, 2013a). In this sense, FARC use the concept to politically position and differentiate 
themselves from the political elite and the decisions they take while dropping the use of the 
strongest demeaning adjectives given to oligarchy, like ‘terrorist’ or ‘bloodthirsty’. 
                                                            
15 I say successful because it ended with a Peace agreement signed by the Colombian Government and FARC 
that, although was not approved by the popular referendum, was approved through the Senate. This is also why 
I refer to closures in plural, as they were two, one before and one after the referendum. 
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Accordingly, FARC states in a Comunicado that they are the result of a set of issues and 
weapons, used by the Colombian oligarchy to put themselves in the rulers of the State until 
the end of times (2013b). 
Regarding FARC’s perception of the Colombian Army, the main change is the moderation 
of some of their statements. In this sense, Timochenko states in 2012 that there are some 
elements, who completely indoctrinated by the National security rhetoric, are ‘ambitious and 
warmongers who allow themselves to be part of the dirtiest purposes’ (FARC, 2012c). 
Thereupon, Timochenko also acknowledges that there must also be in the military cadres be 
‘patriot, honest militaries who question their role in supporting an unfair order…’ (FARC, 
2012c).  
On the other hand, FARC’s perception of the soldiers they fought in the battle field as 
‘brother campesinos’ did not change. In this sense, Timochenko addressed to them in his 
2012 speech in the following way: 
Nobody like the guerrillas to attest the strength and courage of Colombian soldiers and policeman. We 
combat them on a daily basis throughout all the national territory. They cause our casualties and are in 
turn reached by the fire of our weapons. They know well that need have pushed them to risk their lives, 
that they feed their families with permanent fear to death or invalidity. They are Colombians from the 
populace, who love live and dream to make it longer. (My translation, FARC, 2012c) 
In this sense, soldiers are still considered as equals, campesinos like the guerrilleros. People 
who do what they do for need, to feed their families; people who ultimately do not want war 
to continue.  
Regarding the change of perception of the enemy of Colombia’s Government, the one and 
most important, undeniably, was the change that acknowledged FARC as a political insurgent 
actor after being defined as a terrorist for over a decade. Before we get to this turning point, 
it seems reasonable to succinctly show how FARC was perceived before Uribe’s government. 
This might help explain why the change that happened during Santos government was key 
to the peace process. 
To start, in 1964 before FARC was even officially founded, the official representatives of the 
government referred to this group that was about to become FARC; as ‘antisocial’, 
‘communists’ or ‘bandits’ (Alape, 1989). In 1966 FARC officially became a subversive 
group that claimed to be inspired on Marxist-Lenninist ideology. Given the context of the 
Cold war, the ideological contest it was and the success of the Cuban Revolution; these 
groups were considered a threat for the security of the hemisphere and for US hegemony. In 
other words, the sprout of subversive groups in Latin America represented a communist 
threat for the hemisphere and the US. Not in vain, US interventions in Latin American 
countries, which included the promotion or orchestration to overthrow a government; 
responded to what was perceived as an ideologically threat (Dominguez, 1999). That is, the 
threat to have a ‘second Cuba’ in the continent. 
In 1991, guerrillas that had not demobilized, were called ‘dinosaurs’ by the chief negotiator 
of Colombia’s president Gaviria (1990-1994) (Farah, 1994). Guerrillas, the armed revolution 
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and overall communism, was perceived as outdated. This view was also shared by the 
intellectuals of the time, who wrote a letter in 1992 to the Simón Bolívar Guerrillera 
Coordinating Board, stating that guerrillas war was going ‘in the opposite direction of 
history’, that ‘it had lost its validity’ (My translation, El Tiempo, 1992).  
This position can be understood if we are aware of the context, where capitalism presents 
itself after a long Cold war, as the only and one true path of history. At the end of the 1980s 
and during the 1990s decade, the communist world fell, the Berlin wall in 1989 and the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Farah, 1994). And so, western liberal democracy 
appeared triumphantly, like the only possible path due to the inexistence of viable alternatives. 
Not for nothing, Fukuyama claimed, in his renowned 1989’ article ‘The end of history?’, that 
the end of Cold war was also ‘…the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's 
ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form 
of human government’ (Fukuyama, 1898, p.1).  
To this effect, during the 1990s FARC’s political claim was recognized as such, as political, 
despite it was perceived as outdated by the ‘intellectuals’ and the Colombian government. 
Now, as it was showed before, the mid and the end of the 1990s was a key moment for 
Colombian conflict due to way drug trafficking and the policies against it, improved funding 
for illegal armed groups.  
It is important to note that during the various peace dialogues that the Colombian government 
had with FARC, they were recognized as a political actor (Revista Semana, 2008). With Law 
782 of 2002, the Colombian government was not required anymore to recognize illegal armed 
groups with whom it wanted to start peace dialogues (Revista Semana, 2008). In this sense, 
the last time FARC were recognized as a political actor was during 1999 peace dialogues. 
From 2002, with the end of dialogues and the new hard line president, FARC started to be 
considered as terrorists and the internal armed conflict a ‘terrorist menace’ (Revista Semana, 
2005; El Tiempo, 2011). Moreover, the possibility of a peace negotiation was out of any 
political implication, no recognition as a political actor and no political agenda. In fact, this 
was what happened with the demobilization of paramilitaries. 
In 2011, Santos acknowledged that Colombia was in an internal armed conflict, once he 
‘…endorsed the inclusion of an article in the Law of Victims with that concept, to prevent 
victims of common crimes to slip through into the benefits of the Law’ (My translation, El 
Tiempo, 2011a). Although this acknowledgement meant a crucial change in the path towards 
peace, the government decided to downplay it presenting it as a legal technicality that had no 
major political consequences. This argumentative move was done to avoid polarization and 
try to look for consensus16. Nonetheless, it did have major political consequences. 
Regarding the perception of FARC as such it is important to note that no claims about 
FARC’s status as a political actor was made while the peace dialogues were taking place. At 
                                                            
16 For a complete and detailed analysis of discourse regarding the way this decision was handled by Santos see 
Rhetorical construction of armed conflict through the presidential address of Juan Manuel Santos 
(http://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/anpol/article/view/43499/44785#1) 
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the beginning of the dialogues, Santos declared that, if FARC approached the next phase of 
the negotiations with the same seriousness, ‘we have good prospects’ (El Tiempo, 2012). 
This, of course is a positive change from the terrorist discourse. A change of Colombia’s 
government perception of FARC goes beyond ‘seriousness’ during the speech that closed the 
peace process. In this sense, in 2016 Santos referred to FARC’s decision to pursuit their 
convictions through the political arena in the following way: ‘changing bullets for votes, 
weapons for ideas, is the bravest and most intelligent decision a subversive group can take’ 
(El Tiempo, 2016d). Indeed, in 2016, after a peace agreement was reached, Colombia’s 
government openly recognized FARC as an armed actor with political convictions, a 
subversive group instead of a terrorist.  
It is relevant to note that, conversely to this non-reference to the political status of FARC at 
the start of the peace dialogues, Timochenko emphasized it from the very beginning saying: 
‘we have come back to the negotiating table acknowledged like military and political 
adversaries’ (My translation, FARC, 2012). This, of course, is related to the important 
position the political recognition had for them. As it has been stated before, to be recognized 
as an insurgent and political actor was for FARC a fundamental condition to start peace 
dialogues. To have it otherwise, was not acceptable for FARC as it ignored their raison d’être.  
To conclude, there is evidence to claim that there is a change on how the perception of ‘the 
other’ goes from being an enemy, a terrorist, to a political adversary. This change can be 
highlighted in two additional common features both FARC’s and Colombia government 
discourse share. First, not Santos nor Timochenko used during their speeches in 2012 or 2016, 
the word ‘terrorism’ to refer to each other. This, despite the fact that both Colombia’s 
government and FARC, had largely used the word to characterize each other’s actions.  
Second, both disputants insist that their ideas continue to be very different and that they have 
large disagreements. However, they emphasize they have agreed on being disputants in a 
political arena, without appealing to violence. To this effect, Timochenko stated that ‘Here 
nobody has renounced to their ideas […] we have agreed that we will keep on openly confront 
our ideas on the political arena, without violence…’ (My translation, El Tiempo, 2016e). 
Meanwhile, Santos assured that ‘I […] will defend, with as much determination as I have had 
to defeat you, your right to express and continue your politic struggle through legal channels; 
even if we never agree’ (My translation, El Tiempo, 2016d) 
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Table 4 Change of perceptions of the enemy. Colombia’s state and FARC 
 
 
3.4. Attempts to de-securitize coca plantation in the Peace 
agreement. 
 
In 2016, the Colombian government and FARC signed a peace agreement to put an end to 
more than half a century of internal armed conflict. One of the six items that these disputants 
agreed upon was on finding a ‘solution to the problem of illicit drugs’. This solution is based 
on three main programs: the substitution of crops for illicit use program (thereafter 2016 
Substitution program); the consume prevention and public health program and the program 
for the solution of production and commercialization of narcotics. This section will focus on 
the first program and explore the elements of de-securitization. In this sense I will identify 
the de-securitizing language, the change of the language used regarding coca plantation, the 
de-securitizing actors and their position of authority; the audience(s) and the contextual 
conditions of the agreed program for the substitution of crops for illicit use. The main results 
of this analysis can be seen in Table 5Table 5.  
Regarding the language to address the issue of coca plantation, the 2016 Substitution program 
shows fundamental changes in comparison with the previous policies. These changes in the 
language can be grouped in two: definition of coca, cannabis or poppy crops and objective 
of the program. All these changes in the language can be considered as part of a move towards 
de-securitization. 
 Colombia’s State FARC-EP 
Motivation to end the conflict 
2. Change 
perceptions 
of the 
enemy 
From (1960s) ‘antisocial’, 
‘communists’, ‘bandits’ 
To (1990s) ‘dinosaurs’, ‘outdated’ 
To (2002-2010) ‘terrorists’, ‘terrorist 
beast’, ‘terrorist menace’ 
To (2012) ‘serious counterpart in the 
peace dialogues’ (Colombian state) // 
‘Military and political adversaries’ 
(FARC-EP) 
To (2016) subversive group with 
political convictions 
 
No use of the term ‘terrorism’ to refer 
to FARC-EP 
 ‘The Other’ is a political adversary 
(a) Of the Colombian state: From ‘Paramilitary 
state’, ‘Terrorist state’ to ‘courageous 
interlocutor’ with ‘proved intentions’ for a peace 
agreement 
Of Colombian politicians: From ‘reactionary, 
bloodthirsty, terrorist oligarchy’ to ‘oligarchy’ 
(b) Of Cadres of the Army: From ‘mercenaries of 
the oligarchy and the empire’ to ‘there must be 
some patriotic, honest militaries’ 
(c) Of soldiers: brother campesinos like 
guerrilleros  
 
No use of the term ‘terrorism’ to refer to 
Colombian state 
 ‘The Other’ is a political adversary  
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The first change refers to the definition of coca, cannabis and poppy crops. On this point, the 
2016 Substitution program coins the term cultivos de uso ilícito (illicit use crops) instead of 
cultivos ilícitos (illicit crops). The importance of this, relies on the fact that the term illicit 
use crops emphasizes on the use of the crops and not on the crop itself. In other words, the 
new term denotes that growing coca bushes is not a crime per se, that there are different uses 
of the crop, that coca is different from cocaine; that coca does not kill, like the 2008-launched 
campaign argued. In this sense, the change of the term attempts to take away from coca crops 
the image of being inherently threatening and damaging. 
In line with this, the 2016 Substitution program takes a step out of the securitizing speech, 
dropping the reference to threats and menaces to refer to the issue of coca crops. To this 
effect, the program refers to illicit use crops as a problem. This can be considered a de-
securitizing language as it evidences the discursive attempt to take coca plantation from the 
realm of security to that of normal politics.  
Now, the second change in the language used in the 2016 Substitution program refers to its 
objective. Once coca plants stop being considered just a shorter name for cocaine, because 
other uses of the plant are acknowledged in its definition; coca stops being the bush that kills. 
Hence, coca by itself is no longer considered a threat. As a result, the elimination of coca 
crops is not anymore the main objective of the policies developed in the 2016 Substitution 
program and eradication is not its main strategy.  
As the name of the 2016 Substitution program itself points out, the program is about crop 
substitution and not any form of eradication, as was the case before. In this sense, one 
fundamental principle of the Program is the voluntary substitution of crops. The principle 
reads that ‘[a]n undisputed basis for a definitive solution to the problem of illicit use crops 
lies on the voluntary and concerted nature [...] the willingness of communities to [...] move 
towards alternative paths to illicit use crops’(My translation, República de Colombia, FARC, 
2016, p.107). Important to note that although voluntary substitution of crops would equal 
voluntary eradication in terms of cutting down coca plantation with the consent of coca 
growers; the term eradication is avoided in the 2016 Substitution program. Again, this can 
be explained as an attempt to move from the repeated emphasis that has been put on 
eradication as a solution, to the voluntary substitution of these crops.  
This strong focus on voluntary substitution and its importance in guaranteeing a long term 
solution of the illicit use crops problem, shows an attempt to focus on the solution on causes 
that are not security-related. That is to address the social conditions of the communities that 
grow coca crops. Hence, the first objective of the 2016 Substitution program is: 
To overcome poverty conditions of communities, […] through the creation of conditions of well-being 
and buen vivir on the territories; and contribute to structural transformations in rural society that will 
result from the implementation of the Integral rural reform… (My translation, República de Colombia, 
FARC, 2016, p.104). 
This focus on non-security related causes of coca plantation can be considered as part of a 
de-securitization process. While securitization ‘…can often obscure alternative 
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understandings and causal chains’ (Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka, 2016, p. 505), de-
securitization would make them visible and reclaim back their importance. 
This change of strategies from eradication to substitution, is what the new concept of illicit 
use crops entails, performs; an attempt to de-stigmatize coca, take away its image of vital 
threat and de-securitize coca plantations. The outcome of this change is that militarized and 
forceful strategies are no longer the main strategies to address coca plantations.  
Continuing with the identification of the elements of de-securitization, the de-securitizing 
actors are the Colombian government and FARC. The audiences are the Colombian 
population, the political opposition, the US and the international community. The reasons 
why these actors have a position of authority to attempt a de-securitization differs from one 
another. In the case of the Colombian government, its authority comes from the possibility it 
has to readdress policies and funding, according to the approach. FARC, on the other hand, 
has an authority position that is related to its experience: as they partially funded themselves 
from the economy of drug trafficking, through taxation of traffickers. Moreover, guerrillas 
experience in drug trafficking also included safeguarding ‘…the interests of the peasants who 
cultivate these illegal crops by making sure that traffickers (a) pay on time and (b) pay the 
market value’ (Richani, 1997, p.48). In this sense, FARC’s position of authority as a de-
securitization actor could be related to their first-hand experiences about coca growers’ 
livelihoods, needs and perceptions of the problem. Having this in mind, the de-securitizing 
attempt is conducted by a former securitizing actor and, Colombian government; and FARC, 
which could be considered as representative of coca growers, ‘the previously silenced Other’ 
(Coskun, 2011, p.20). 
As a result, the 2016 Substitution program presents some fundamental changes regarding the 
perception of coca growers in the chain of drug production and trafficking. To start, coca 
growers are considered, along with drug consumers, the weakest link of drug production. As 
a consequence of this and the deprived conditions of coca growers, the 2016 Substitution 
program includes a differentiated treatment to coca growers. This means that Colombia’s 
government agreed to temporarily renounce to exert any criminal punishment against coca 
growers (República de Colombia, FARC, 2016, p.108). Besides, the previous ‘zero illicit 
crops’ condition to access alternative development projects, changed in the 2016 Substitution 
program for an agreement of all the community and a schedule of gradual eradication to have 
access to the program. This shows a more understanding approach about coca grower’s 
livelihoods. If they grow coca to live, because there is no other option for them, asking them 
to eradicate their main source of income without having yet anything to replace it; was 
overlooking their context. 
Along the same lines of putting back in context what was consider a threat, several reports 
about the human face of coca plantation have been published since 2016. In these reports, 
media present the stories of people who live from growing coca or being raspachines, people 
who pick up the coca leaves. In these reports, people from different regions are presented in 
a short video or quote, showing their faces and telling their story. Most of them mention as 
reasons for doing what growing or picking up coca: lack of infrastructure, lack of access to 
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rural credits, unemployment and in general lack of opportunities for people in rural areas 
(Especiales Semana, 2017). This new interest on coca growers’ and raspachines’ lives can 
be framed as well as an attempt to de-securitize coca bush, putting people who grow it, in a 
context of everyday practices and concerns. This can help ‘de-dramatize’ the securitized 
question, as Huysmans put it (2006); and address them within their context. This addressing 
of a securitized issue within a context means to look at the other aspects that relate to the 
securitized issue, to take back into consideration everyday aspects that were left out in the 
securitizing move. 
The last element of de-securitization for the analysis are the conditions that point out the need 
for it. On the one hand, we have the already existing Latin American context, which pointed 
out for a need of de-securitization, although without further results for the national reality of 
Colombia. In fact, in 2009 the Latin-American Commission about Drugs and Democracy 
declared that according to the evidence, the war on drugs was a failed war, which had not 
produced the expected results. Indeed, the Declaration reads ‘we are farther away from the 
goal of drug eradication’ (My translation, 2009, p.5); which is why the Commission proposed 
a new paradigm based on an approach of public health, prevention and focus of repression 
on organized crime (2009, p.8). Santos pointed towards the same direction, but he did so only 
at an international level, leaving national strategies untouched.  
On the other hand, according to the analysis conducted in the previous sections, I argue that 
the external conditions that facilitated the attempt to de-securitize the strategies towards illicit 
use crops is the fact that both disputants challenged their perceptions of a former enemy and 
scaled down their aspirations; during peace dialogues. In this sense, it is this encounter with 
new information about the other and ‘the Other’ him/herself what allows a challenge of 
previous perceptions. The reason why this is fundamental in explaining the change between 
securitization and de-securitization, is that the challenge of the perception of the other in 
readiness theory, can be paralleled with the de-securitizing move of changing the language 
and moving away from the threat definition. This means that de-securitization as well as 
peace negotiation processes are based on the redefinition and recognition of ‘the Other’, ‘the 
threat’, ‘the enemy’ in different terms from those already existing. The different components 
and facilitating conditions revised in this section can be found in Table 5. 
Finally, it is important to note that I claim that the Program proposed by the 2016 Peace 
agreement is an attempt to de-securitize coca plantation due to the position of Colombia at 
the international arena and the long standing institutionalization of the securitized strategies. 
This means that Colombia has not the discursive nor the economic power to overthrow or 
change by itself the paradigm of the war on drugs and that the successful securitizing move 
about drugs has kept the same extraordinary measures on place for decades. In this context 
of unequal state power and securitizing routines to address drugs and coca, the 2016 Program 
is an attempt to de-securitize coca that faces resistances. To take a case in point, Donald 
Trump, current US President, demanded the renewal of the spraying with herbicide after 
Santos halted the implementation of the policy. In this sense, the US Secretary of State, Rex 
Tillerson, said: ‘We have told them [Colombia] that we have to get back to the spraying, we 
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got to get back to destroying these fields…’ (C-Span, 2017). To make evident the 
institutionalization of the securitizing move, it is relevant to point out that Tillerson referred 
to ‘cocaine fields’ when talking about coca crops.  
Table 5. De-securitization components and analysis of Colombian strategy to fight coca 
plantations in the Peace agreement 
  
  
 De-securitization Peace agreement 2016 
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
ts
 1. De-securitizing Language  
2. De-securitizing actor 
3. Audience(s) 
[Results: Resistances] 
1. Moving out of the securitizing speech, tacitly and not 
explicitly. No reference to threats or menaces, but 
problems.  
2. Colombian state and FARC 
3. Colombian population, Colombian political 
opposition, US, international community 
F
a
ci
li
ta
ti
n
g
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
4. The change in the language 
used to define the 
previously securitized 
issue 
5. Social conditions: position 
of authority of the DA 
regarding the audience(s) 
6. [Context] conditions that 
point out the necessity for 
de-securitization 
4. Changes in language used.  
-Definition: From Illicit crops to Illicit use crops. 
-Objective. From eradication/ elimination of crops to 
substitution of crops /structural transformation of 
territories 
5. Colombian government: state apparatus.  
FARC: authority position related to their connection 
with drug economy to fund themselves, closer to coca 
growers’ perception 
6. Ripe conflict and readiness of the actors. 
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4. Results and conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis presents a possible explanation for the change of strategies to address coca 
plantation in Colombia before and after the 2016 Peace agreement. This explanation was 
done based on the theoretical model drawn on securitization/de-securitization theory and 
ripeness/readiness theory. Chapter 2 presents the description of both securitization/de-
securitization theoretical framework (in section 2.1) and ripeness/readiness theory (in section 
2.2) as well as the proposed theoretical model that merges both theories to explain the attempt 
to de-securitize coca plantation in a context of conflict (in section 2.3).  
According with the theoretical model presented in the subsection 2.3, Chapter 3 started with 
the analysis of the public policies and strategies used to fight coca plantation before the 2016 
Peace agreement and identified its securitization components (section 3.1). In sections 3.2 
and 3.3, I used ripeness/readiness theory in order to explain the context of the peace 
negotiations that gave birth to the 2016 Peace agreement. More specifically, section 3.2 
explored the concepts of crisis of tactics and crisis of strategy in the 1999 and 2012 peace 
dialogues and the concepts of Motivation and Optimism in the perception of the conflict of 
Colombian government and FARC. According to the analysis, 1999 peace dialogues were 
the result of a crisis of tactics of the conflict wheatear 2012 peace dialogues were the result 
of a crisis of strategy, and so there was certain degree of readiness of the disputants and thus 
certain degree of ripeness of the conflict. This means that in 2012 peace talks, the disputants 
had Motivation and Optimism to end the conflict. Section 3.3 focused on the analysis of the 
two mechanisms that Motivation has to influence Optimism that are most relevant for this 
investigation: the scaling down of aspirations (in subsection 3.3.1) and the change of 
perception of the enemy (in subsection 3.3.2). Finally, section 3.4, identifies the de-
securitizing components of the 2016 Substitution program from the Peace agreement. 
In line with this analysis, this thesis has three main results. First, that the strategies to address 
coca plantation before 2016 were the result of a successful securitizing move at an 
international level, implemented in Colombia through Plan Colombia. In this sense, coca was 
construed as a vital threat (‘illicit crop’, ‘the bush that kills’) and as such, policies to address 
coca crop aim to completely eliminate, eradicate it; regardless of the consequences 
(extraordinary measures). 
Second, the 2016 Substitution program is an attempt to de-securitize coca plantation in 
Colombia. In this sense, coca plantation went from being considered a vital threat, to be 
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considered a challenge and a crop that is not by itself dangerous. In this sense, the language 
to refer to coca crops went from ‘illicit crop’ to ‘illicit use crop’, change that acknowledges 
the existence of the other uses of the plant. Accordingly, the 2016 Substitution program focus 
on substitution of coca and the structural transformation of territories, rather than coca 
elimination. Moreover, this attempt to de-securitize coca has encountered resistances from 
previous securitizing actors, like the US. These resistances can be explained as the result of 
the institutionalization of the successful securitizing move and the power structures between 
states. 
Third, the change of strategies (from securitization to de-securitization) can be explained by 
the change of aspirations and of perceptions of ‘the Other’ by the main disputants of the 
Colombian conflict. In this sense, the most important changes regarding these two 
mechanisms were the redefinition of victory and the objectives of confrontation and the 
acknowledge of ‘the Other’, the former enemy as a valid interlocutor. On the one hand 
disputants’ aspirations changed from defeating FARC (Colombian government) or changing 
the regime through armed revolution (FARC), to achieve peace (Colombian government) 
and have a real democracy with social justice (FARC). On the other hand, regarding the 
change of perceptions of ‘the Other’, both disputants stopped referring to one another as 
terrorists and instead were recognized as a valid interlocutor: a political subversive group 
(FARC) and a courageous interlocutor (Colombian government). 
To sum up, the attempt to de-securitize coca plantation at a national level in Colombia- and 
not only discursively at an international level- that the 2016 Peace agreement represents; can 
be explained by the scaling down of aspirations and the change of perception of ‘the Other’ 
that was done due to the ripeness/readiness of the Colombian conflict. This means that the 
attempt to de-securitize coca plantation in 2016 Peace agreement, can be explained by the 
ripeness/readiness of the Colombian conflict. More specifically, the de-securitizing attempt 
can be explained by the change of aspirations and of perceptions of ‘the Other’ by the 
disputants of a conflict. 
Now, the relevance of this thesis can be framed in academic and political terms. To start, this 
investigation has sought to create a dialogue between securitization theory and theories about 
conflict resolution. In relation to the literature of securitization associated with the 
Copenhagen School, this thesis contributes to the group of attempts to apply securitization to 
empirical cases and the small group that tries to do so in non-European cases. Moreover, the 
emphasis on both securitization and de-securitization, allows an analysis that contributes to 
the further development of the untheorized concept of de-securitization. Regarding the 
political relevance of this thesis, it is important to point that given the fact that the 2016 peace 
agreement is being currently implemented, this analysis could inform public policy processes 
as well as the construction of a political stand that is more aware of the political implications 
and difficulties of this move and the probable new coming conflicts. 
Finally, further research about the matter studied in this thesis, could focus on the role and 
the position of other actors that were and still are part of this attempt to de-securitize coca 
plantation in Colombia like: international organizations, facilitating states during the peace 
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negotiations, other states (i.e. US), indigenous organizations, coca growers (who have started 
to organize themselves) and other armed actors.  
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Appendix 1 Crisis of tactics in 1999 Peace 
negotiations in Colombia 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1998 Andrés Pastrana was elected president of Colombia, and as promised in his campaign, 
he started a peace dialogue with FARC. Pastrana met FARC’s condition of demilitarizing 
five municipalities of the southeast of Colombia (FARC, 1998). This demilitarized zone 
(DMZ), was approximately 42.139 km2 big (El Tiempo, 2010b), about the size of Switzerland. 
Consequently, on January 1999 the peace talks table with FARC were installed in one of the 
municipalities of the DMZ, San Vicente del Caguán. These talks had several moments of 
crisis, due to various reasons, that in their majority can be related to two big questions.  
First, the negotiations were stuck due to the disagreement about some of the conditions to be 
met to continue the negotiations. For instance, the government insisted on the need to have a 
commission of verification for the DMZ, so that it was not used for military purposes (Bolívar 
Ramírez, 2006). From June to September 1999 the dialogues were broken, as FARC did not 
agree on having such a commission. It was not until the Colombian government desisted 
about the requirement of a verification commission or an accompanying commission, that 
the dialogues could continue (Bolívar Ramírez, 2006). Similarly, on October 2001, the peace 
talks were in crisis due to the governmental decision of controlling the limits of the DMZ. 
This measure was unacceptable for FARC (Bolívar Ramírez, 2006). 
The dialogues were also frozen for what FARC claimed as an ‘insufficient fight against 
paramilitaries’. FARC had repeatedly claimed that ‘paramilitarism was a State’s 
counterinsurgency strategy, developed by Colombia’s Army, whose absurd objective was to 
defeat guerrillas killing civilians’ (1999). In fact, paramilitaries’ expansion and crimes were 
committed with the support of Colombia’s Army (Verdad Abierta, 2012). And according to 
Restrepo and Spagat (2004, p.14), 70% of paramilitaries’ activities consisted on massacring 
civilians. 
The other set of reasons why the peace talks went through several crisis, was the continuation 
of violent acts while having the peace dialogues. Indeed, between 1996 and 2005 there was 
an escalation and intensification of the conflict, a period with a major upsurge in the conflict 
(Restrepo, Spagat y Vargas, 2006, p.106). During this period, a person was injured by an 
antipersonnel mine each day and a person was kidnapped every eight hours (GMH, 2013, 
p.34). Terrorist acts went from 10 before 1995 to 63 between 1996 and 2004 (GMH, 2013, 
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p.102). 70% of the big massacres committed during the internal conflict were committed in 
this period of escalation (GMH, 2013, p.50). Consequently to the rising violence, the number 
of people displaced in Colombia went from 819.510 before 1995 to 2.014.893 in 2002 (GMH, 
2013, p.71). 
These two set of crisis ultimately a great amount of distrust between the actors. On the night 
of the 20th February 2002, after FARC hijacked a commercial airliner and kidnapped Senator 
Jorge Gechem (Beittel, 2012, p.14), Pastrana announced the end of the peace negotiations.  
FARC and the Colombian government were not in the ‘readiness’ stage when the peace talks 
started in 1999. This means that the conflict was not ripe for a negotiated solution. Instead, 
these peace talks were part of a revision of tactics of the conflict, and as such an instance to 
mainly re-arm themselves. To evidence if the actors were in a readiness stage it is important 
to first define if they perceived the conflict as dysfunctional. To recap, a conflict is perceived 
as dysfunctional if (a) the actor perceives the conflict is not being won or that it is being lost 
or the actor perceives continuing the conflict results in (b) increasing costs or (c) increasing 
risks. 
In the case of FARC, for instance, it is improbable they would consider the conflict was 
dysfunctional. At the end of the 1990s, FARC were stronger than ever, with ‘…an estimated 
of 18.000 full-time members and 12.000 militia members in 1999’ (Chernick, 2005 quoted 
by Jonsson, Brennan and O’Hara, 2016, p.547) and the control of 40% of the national 
territory according to some observers (Beittel, 2015, p.5). Consider that during the 1990s 
FARC were able to occupy six military bases in five different departments of Colombia 
(Medina Arbelaez, 2008, p.11). Additionally, the economic bonanza pushed by their 
incursion into drug trafficking, gave them the resources ‘…to a steady increase in recruitment, 
armed actions, geographic mobility, military capacity, and technological prowess’ (Chernick, 
2005, p.179).  
In this sense, it was unlikely that FARC would perceive they were losing the conflict, or that 
the costs or the risks were too high to continue. Instead, they considered the conflict was 
about to be fruitful, as their ultimate objective to take over the state’s power, was closer than 
ever. This can be evidenced in the change of their attitude towards the local political class of 
regions they had social and political influence. In 1997, it changed from coexistence to 
absolute animosity against any state presence (GMH, 3012, p.164). Even Colombians 
thought FARC would someday take the power by force, as was revealed by the results of a 
pull published in 1999 (DeShazo, Mendelson Forman, and McLean, 2009, p.10).  
The case of Colombia’s state was different, they did consider the conflict was dysfunctional. 
According to what was described before, during the 1990s, Colombia experienced the 
expansion of drug trafficking, insurgent groups and paramilitaries while having a weak state 
power and institutions to face them. Washington’s perception about Colombia was that it was 
about to implode (Crandall, 2002, 163). Indeed, Colombia was facing a ‘potential state failure’ 
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(DeShazo, Mendelson Forman, and McLean, 2009, p.1). And undoubtedly, that was also the 
perception of Colombia’s new head of state in 1998, Andrés Pastrana. At his presidential 
inauguration speech, he referred to the ‘deep damages that the narcotraffic phenomena has 
had in Colombia’ which included environmental destruction, the promotion of corruption, 
violence and an increasing drug consumption. He then continues stating that ‘if Colombia 
survives despite so many disgraces is only because of the moral strength of a population to 
face them’ (Andrés Pastrana Arango, 2015a). This means Colombia’s state perceived it was 
losing the conflict and as such, the conflict was perceived as a source of great risk. Admittedly, 
Colombia’s traditional state was at stake.  
So FARC had no reason to perceive the conflict as too risky or costly, whereas Colombia’s 
state was almost collapsed, and as such perceived the conflict as dysfunctional. The peace 
process with FARC, could be read as a reflection of Colombia’s readiness stage, as it 
perceived both the dysfunctionality of the conflict, which constituted a Motivation to end the 
conflict and the Optimism of having a negotiated way out of it (Pruitt, 2005). However, 
according to Pruitt, the initial perception of a conflict being dysfunctional would likely lead 
the disputant ‘…to seek a better way to wage the conflict, not to end it’ (2005, p.16). It was 
indeed, the first time that Colombia seemed about to lose the conflict against a guerrilla. 
Moreover, it seems unlikely that the Government of Colombia was at a readiness state, 
looking for a negotiated end to the conflict, given the distrust and the power imbalance 
between the actors. This power imbalance was something both actors were aware of, which 
is why Colombia’s government kept on giving in and FARC kept on showing its strength. In 
fact, this imbalance of power could as well make evident for Colombia’s state that FARC 
had no reason to be in a readiness stage. 
In short, nor FARC or Colombia’s state were at a readiness stage. On one side, FARC didn’t 
consider the conflict was dysfunctional. On the other, Colombia’s state considered the 
conflict was dysfunctional, but at the same time was aware of the power imbalance in the 
peace process or fighting the conflict. Furthermore, following Pruitt (2005), as this perception 
of dysfunctionality of the conflict was initial for Colombia’s state, it was probable that it 
would lead to a revision of tactics rather than a revision of strategies.  
For these reasons, I argue that 1999 peace talks were used by both actors to fulfill interests 
that were beyond the negotiations, which is the objective of peace dialogues that are done to 
deceive (Iklé, 1964, p.51 quoted by Ghosn, 2010, p.1058). These interests beyond the peace 
negotiations were the revision of tactics to continue the conflict. As it was already mentioned, 
the revision of tactics can be done in three ways: escalation of the conflict, co-optation and/or 
coalition building. The 1999-initiated peace talks between Colombia’s government and 
FARC, evidence two of them. I will develop this idea in the following paragraphs, as I refer 
to what each actor did during the peace process. 
In the case of FARC, the preparation to escalate the conflict can be evidenced in the 
‘misusage’ of the DMZ. This was one of the main accusations of Pastrana when he ended the 
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peace dialogues in 2002. During his speech Pastrana showed the results of the DMZ 
surveillance he ordered to General Tapias. This report, he says, proves that FARC have used 
the DMZ for purposes beyond the purpose they agreed on, that is to have the peace talks. 
According to the report, FARC had built in the DMZ about new 25 clandestine airstrips, 
facilities, roads into the forest and training camps; they had also expanded the plantation of 
coca crops and used the DMZ to have contact with international terrorists (Andrés Pastrana 
Arango, 2015b). Indeed, after the peace dialogues, the estimates of FARC combatants rose 
to 20.776 (Noticias RCN, 2015) and between 1999 and 2002, FARC kidnapped 43% of all 
the people kidnapped by FARC in 40 years (Cifras y Conceptos, 2017). Additionally, 
Colombia presented in 1999 and 2000 the highest number of hectares of coca bushes 
cultivated (160,119 and 163,289 respectively) and the highest projected manufacture of 
cocaine (680 metric tons and 695 metric tons respectively) (UNODC, 2002, p.57)  
On the other hand, Colombian government revision of tactics were focused on preparing for 
escalating the conflict and collaboration building with the US, specifically. In this sense, 
Colombia’s new president, Pastrana, meant a resurgence of bilateral relations with the US. 
In this sense, Colombia’s government had, in March 1999, the first Defense Bilateral 
Working Group (BWG) with the US. This BWG offered a ‘…clear break with the Samper 
years and clear[ed] the way for specific progress on human rights, military justice reform, 
and military institutional reform as well as counternarcotics issues’ (U.S. Congress, 1999a). 
In this sense, Colombian Army started creating in 1999 ‘…a special Counternarcotics 
Battalion with US Army assistance [to support] the CNP [Colombian National Police] in 
their efforts to move counterdrug operations into the Putumayo region.’ (U.S. Congress, 
1999b). To add to this military aid strategy, on July 2000 the US president, sanctioned the 
legislation that supported Plan Colombia. This plan provided $1.3 billion for 
counternarcotics (Crandall, 2002, p.160) and was exclusively focused on interdiction, 
eradication programs and giving support for aerial eradication (Beittel, 2012, p.36).  
Moreover, Pastrana started a professionalization of soldiers and a militarization of the State, 
through ‘Plan 10.000’. This Plan was announced shortly after Pastrana’s inauguration and its 
objective was to ‘…professionalise the army by training 10,000 new soldiers per year in 
counterinsurgency not drug interdiction (as such)’ (Mendez, 2017). The US funded such 
training. As a result, ‘…between 1998 and 2002, the armed forces in Colombia grew by 60% 
to 132.000’ (Beittel, 2015, p.11).  
In this sense, Colombia’s government not only revised its tactics through escalating the 
conflict, re-arming itself; it also built a coalition with US, to reinforce the militarization of 
the State through Plan Colombia. Although the coalition built with paramilitary groups is not 
going to be explored here, it is significant to mention that it existed (GMH, 2013). This 
coalition between paramilitary groups and the Military forces continued until the former 
group demobilized in 2005. 
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Now, both ways of revising tactics escalation and coalition building, were acknowledged by 
FARC, who persistently accused Colombian government of being hypocritical as it  
…demanded from FARC ‘peace gestures’, while at the same time escalates the confrontation with the 
formation of the Military Forces and the Police, encourages the terrorism of paramilitary groups with 
the open participation of military commanders and develops Plan Colombia which was commanded 
by the US (FARC, 2002) 
Given the evidence, I can argue that indeed, when Pastrana installed the peace talks table 
with FARC, it was due to a crisis of tactics. This means that both actors used peace talks to 
find new ways of continuing the ongoing conflict thorough escalation and coalition building. 
In fact, Granada, Restrepo and Vargas agree that ‘…it was not just about the military 
adjustments of FARC, taking advantage of the peace negotiations and the DMZ. The 
escalation was deeply related with the organization restructure, the strategic reorientation, 
the doctrine changes and the use of new technologies by the public forces of the state; all of 
which started with Pastrana’s administration’ (2009, p. 40).  
The escalation that started in Pastrana’s administration and continued with next president’s 
mandate, Álvaro Uribe. In fact, Restrepo, Spagat and Vargas (2006, p.106) observe that there 
was an escalation and intensification of the conflict, between 1996 and 2005, a period with a 
major upsurge in the conflict. This continued intensification of the conflict after the peace 
dialogues ended, responded to a change of status of FARC, from an armed insurgency group 
to a terrorist organization. This discursive change from insurgency to terrorism, happened at 
an international and a national level.  
When Plan Colombia was presented to the US Congress, Clinton’s administration showed 
that US aid was specifically to fight the war on drugs in one of the source countries and not 
to support counterinsurgency. This was done with the goal of guaranteeing political support 
in the US Congress, so that the concern of Plan Colombia leading the US to ‘another Vietnam’ 
was dissipated. However, this discursive differentiation between counternarcotics and 
counterinsurgency in US’ aid blurred after the events of September 9th 2011.  
In this direction, when Pastrana ended the peace talks with FARC on February 2002, he made 
specific emphasis on the change of their status, and their decision of going from a political 
actor to a terrorist organization. He said that FARC 
…have denied themselves a political space in the country. After the horrible events of last 9th 
September, I told the guerrilla […] that it was up to them to define themselves through their acts, either 
they are a group of political insurgency or they are a terrorist organization. […] Sadly, today they sign 
their own definition and nobody can doubt that between politics and terrorism, FARC chose terrorism’ 
(My translation, Andrés Pastrana Arango, 2015b) 
Finally, along the same lines of fighting terrorism, Uribe, who ‘promise[d] an 
uncompromising ‘hard hand’ against the insurgents’ (Forero, 2012), won the presidential 
elections of 2002. Within his mandate, FARC and drug trafficking were issues that were no 
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longer treated as separate issues (Beittel, 2015, p.11), which was something that matched 
perfectly Bush’s approach (Benneyworth, 2016, p.108). 
About this, it is important to note that this change in their status will be something 
fundamental for the following stage of the conflict and a central issue to consider the 
possibility of a dialogue in 2012. It is due to this change of status that the difference between 
counternarcotics and counterinsrugence completely blurred away. Before, 9/11 helping to 
defeat guerrillas, as insurgent groups, was to overstep on other countries sovereignty, as was 
the case of US involvement in Vietnam (Crandall, 2002). Conversely, the war on drugs or 
the war on terrorism, allowed for special measures, as happens with every successful 
securitizing move, as showed in Chapter 2. Following this idea, supporting the Colombian 
government to defeat guerrillas was not anymore a matter of sovereignty, it was an issue of 
global security, of defeating terrorism.  
This change of status of FARC and guerrillas in general in Colombia, in hand with the global 
war on terrorism that followed the 9/11; made a more aggressive military actions against 
FARC something desirable for the US and something that they would economically support 
(Crandall, 2002, p.159; Beittel, 2002, p.31). This explains the escalation of the conflict that 
followed the end of the peace dialogues and Uribe’s mandate.  
Uribe’s mandate went around the ‘Democratic security policy’, which focus was to defeat 
guerrillas (Beittel, 2015, p.12). As part of this policy, at the end of 2003 and the beginning 
of 2004, Plan Patriota was launched (Beittel, 2015, p.12). This Plan was the mayor offensive 
done against FARC in the last 40 years. It had the objective to take back urban areas of the 
country and the southern region of Colombia, which was considered FARC’s rear (Semana, 
2006). It was the start of a strong counterinsurgent offensive. This military effort increased 
Colombia’s troop strength to 445.000 in 2010 (GMH, 2013, p.179) and the expenditure on 
Defense reached in 2003 and 2009 more than 4% of Colombia’s Gross Domestic Product 
(Otero-Prada, 2016, p.49). The military expenditure of Colombia, between 1998 and 2012 
was 12% of government spending, having its peak in 2008 with 13,9% (SIPRI, 2017).  
In this sense, the conflict continued and escalated in a different way. As it is shown in Figure 
6, combats between the National Army and FARC started increasing since 1999 and 
continued to do so until it reached its mayor peak in 2004. This explains the change of number 
of deaths directly produced by the conflict, which switched from being mainly civilians 
before to 2002 to be predominantly combatants after 2002. This can be seen in Figure 7. 
Indeed, it was a different escalation of the conflict.  
This analysis allows to point out certain aspects about readiness theory. First, non-honest 
peace talks can be a reflection of the crisis of tactics and the revisions that are trying to be 
made, as they are used as a way to gain time to go back better armed to the battlefield. Second, 
it is not necessary to perceive the conflict as dysfunctional to revise your own tactics, as was 
the case of FARC. Although they did not consider the conflict as being dysfunctional, they 
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did accept to be part of the peace talks even if just to strengthen themselves. Third, to analyze 
the position of both actors in a separate way, as Pruitt (2005) suggests, is important as it 
allows to approach the ripeness moment in a more accurate way.  
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Figure 6. Combats per dyadas, Colombia 1988-2008 
 
Source: Granada, Restrepo and Vargas, 2009, p.41. 
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Figure 7. Direct deaths of the conflict, Colombia 1988-2008 
 
Source: Granada, Restrepo and Vargas, 2009, p.41. 
 
